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DEBT AND DEMOCRACY:
TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
OF BANKRUPTCY
Jonathan C. Lipson*
This Article explores certain important constitutional challenges
presented by bankruptcy. Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution
provides that Congress shall have the power to make "uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies." While there are many good social, political, and
economic theories of bankruptcy, there has been comparatively little effort to
address broadly what it means to have constitutionalized financial distress.
This Article is a first step in that direction.
Constitutional problems with bankruptcy are not new, but present three
underappreciated puzzles: First, why did the Framers put a bankruptcy power
in the Constitution, and how broadly should we construe its "peculiar" lan-
guage today? Second, how should this power interact with structural fea-
tures of our constitutional system, whether vertical (vis-d-vis states) or
horizontal (vis-d-vis other branches)? Third, how should we resolve competi-
tions between this power and substantive protections involving, for example,
property, due process, and religious liberties? Recent Supreme Court deci-
sions broadly interpreting the Bankruptcy Clause, the 2005 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code, and the continuing spate of Catholic diocese bankrupt-
cies, among other things, give these puzzles some urgency.
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the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
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This Article identifies an important, and thus far undeveloped, theme
in the constitutional implications of bankruptcy: "bankruptcy exceptional-
ism." Bankruptcy exceptionalism is an operating principle that helps to
explain why we have a Bankruptcy Clause and how it has sometimes permit-
ted or compelled exceptions to constitutional rules, standards, norms, and
values in order to accommodate the exigencies offinancial distress. The Arti-
cle argues that the bankruptcy power gives Congress broad discretion to legis-
late in response to financial distress, subject to certain important democratic
and countermajoritarian protections.
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[T] he most important law of any society [is] the law regulating the
relation of debtor and creditor.
-James A. Bayard'
Shoplifting is wrong; bankruptcy is also a moral act. Bankruptcy is a
moral as well as an economic act. There is a conscious decision not
to keep one's promises.
-H.R. REP. No. 109-312
[B]ankruptcy law has little to do with natural justice.
-Justice Antonin Scalia
3
Constitutional doctrine? Who needs it! All it brings is trouble and
strife.
-John D. Ayer
4
INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is among the most political-or politicized-of the
business law subjects. It is the place where many of our most difficult
social problems-from mass torts to securities fraud to the plight of
the working poor-come to rest. Over the years, we have developed
many useful theories of the political economy of bankruptcy, includ-
ing institutional and socioeconomic explanations for how the United
States has produced what is by many accounts a unique (and perhaps
uniquely controversial) bankruptcy system.5 Oddly, there is no gen-
eral account of the constitutional framework on which this political
debate rests. 6 This Article is a first step toward filling that gap.
1 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2664 (1799) (statement of Rep. Bayard), quoted in BRUCE
H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS 213 (2002).
2 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 2 n.1 (2005).
3 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4 John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REv. 963, 985
(1989).
5 Some of this literature is summarized infra Part I.
6 This is obviously not to say that we are wholly without constitutional theorizing
on certain aspects of bankruptcy. Some of the better contributions include Ayer,
supra note 4; Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Lessons
of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 SuP. CT. REv. 25 [hereinafter Baird, Bankruptcy Proce-
dure]; Douglas G. Baird, Jury Trials After Granfinanciera, 65 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1991);
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost, 1999
SUP. CT. REv. 393; Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A
General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 743, 862-77 (2000);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 Am. BANKR. L.J. 571 (2005); S. Elizabeth Gibson,
Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of Article III and the Seventh Amendment,
72 MINN. L. REv. 967 (1988); Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1063, 1076-89 (2002) [hereinafter Plank, Federalism]; Thomas E. Plank, The
2008]
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We do not typically think of bankruptcy as a subject so grave as to
warrant constitutional consideration. But the Framers of the Consti-
tution apparently thought otherwise. They gave to Congress-with
surprisingly little debate-the power to make "uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."'7 As a problem
of constitutional dimension, bankruptcy presents at least three sets of
puzzles.
First, there are organic questions that go to the source and text of
the bankruptcy power. Why, for example, did we constitutionalize
bankruptcy at all? Bankruptcy is not typically a provision of other
nations' constitutions. 8 Nor was-or is-it part of England's constitu-
tion,9 whose bankruptcy system was an important influence on ours. 10
Wouldn't some combination of the Commerce, 1 Necessary and
Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REv. 487 (1996) [hereinafter Plank,
Limits]; Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III
Judges, 72 AM. BANR'. L.J. 567 (1998) [hereinafter Plank, Article III]; James Steven
Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Rela-
tionship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARv. L. REV. 973
(1983). My own attempts in this regard include Jonathan C. Lipson, Fighting Fiction
with Fiction: The New Federalism in (a Tobacco Company) Bankruptcy, 78 WASH. U. L.Q.
1271, 1291-339 (2000) [hereinafter Lipson, Fighting Fiction]; Jonathan C. Lipson, First
Principles and Fair Consideration: The Developing Clash Between the First Amendment and the
Constructive Fraudulent Conveyance Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 247, 272-303 (1997)
[hereinafter Lipson, First Principles]; Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty
and Third-Party Harms, 84 MINN. L. REV. 589, 595-635 (2000) [hereinafter Lipson, On
Balance]; Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 363, 408-35 (2006) [hereinafter Lipson, Churches]. The gap in all of
these works-mine included-is the failure to develop a broader theory of the role
that bankruptcy plays in the constitutional order.
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
8 According to data provided by the Comparative Constitutions Project, directed
by Professors Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg at the University of Illinois, twenty-
seven nations have, at various points, generated forty-six constitutions that mention
bankruptcy or insolvency in some way. Some of these countries-for example, Austra-
lia, Canada, and Switzerland-are not surprising. Others, however-Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Uruguay, and Zambia-are. See Comparative Constitutions Project,
https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2008) (specific
data on file with author).
9 See generally WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITuTION (Paul Smith ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (describing, comprehensively, England's unwritten
constitution).
10 See Charles Jordan Tabb, History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 6-7 (1995)
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce .. .among the several States").
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Proper,' 2 and Supremacy1 3 Clauses have given Congress sufficient
power to enact bankruptcy laws? What does its "peculiar" uniformity
language mean?14 Should we care that in 1787 bankruptcy generally
connoted a scope of relief far narrower than is currently
contemplated?
Second, there are structural questions. Although the Constitution
gives Congress the power to make uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcy, Congress has in turn outsourced much of this work to
specialized bankruptcy courts, whose constitutional status is anything
but clear, both vertically (meaning vis-A-vis the states) and horizontally
(meaning vis-;t-vis other federal actors, in particular Article III courts).
Bankruptcy is alone among major federal powers in that it is con-
ducted almost entirely in courts, rather than in an administrative
apparatus. Why is bankruptcy the work of courts, and what is their
jurisdictional reach?
Third, there are substantive questions. These may be the hardest
of all, as they imply competition between Congress' bankruptcy
power, on the one hand, and express or implied constitutional protec-
tions, on the other. How, for example, do we reconcile conflicts
between constitutional standards governing the taking of property,
due process rights to notice and a hearing, or, increasingly, the pro-
tection of religious liberty, on the one hand, and laws enacted under
the Bankruptcy Clause, on the other?
These puzzles are not new. Indeed, the challenges of regulating
financial distress preceded and informed the framing era. In the vast
majority of cases since then, our approach has been to side with the
bankruptcy power, and against any constitutional rule, standard,
norm, or value that may constrict it. While there are obviously going
to be limits to the bankruptcy power, beginning with Sturges v. Crown-
inshield we have long assumed that those limits are quite broad.
15
With only one exception, Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons,1
6
the Court appears never to have struck down legislation on the
grounds that it exceeded Congress' power under the Bankruptcy
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers").
13 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ....").
14 See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819) ("The pecu-
liar terms of the grant certainly deserve notice.").
15 See id.
16 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
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Clause. Only rarely has the Court struck down bankruptcy legislation
on other constitutional grounds.
17
Yet, determining the breadth and depth of this power has taken
on new urgency in the wake of three recent developments. First, in
2006, the Supreme Court gave the Bankruptcy Clause an extraordina-
rily broad interpretation in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz,18
a controversial 5-4 decision which held that the states waived immu-
nity from bankruptcy court jurisdiction by having ratified the Bank-
ruptcy Clause. 19 Second, in 2005, Congress enacted and President
Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (BAPCPA), which amended the Bankruptcy Code in contro-
versial and significant ways. 20 Those unhappy with the amendments
have already begun to challenge their constitutionality. 21 Third, Cath-
olic dioceses, buckling under crushing debts created by priests' sexual
misconduct, continue to commence Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases,
which create serious questions about the relationship between the
Bankruptcy Clause and the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.
22
Because we have not looked holistically at bankruptcy as a consti-
tutional problem, this Article does not purport to provide definitive
answers to these or similar questions.23 The best we can do at this
17 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982)
(striking down the jurisdictional grant of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act as violative of Arti-
cle III); Ashton v. Cameron City Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 532
(1936) (striking down a municipal bankruptcy law as an impermissible encroachment
on state power); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02
(1935) (holding that the Frazier-Lemke Act violated the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause). The vast majority of Supreme Court decisions on bankruptcy consider not
the constitutionality of bankruptcy legislation, but instead construction of the opera-
tive statutes.
18 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
19 Id. at 377-78.
20 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 12, 18, 28 U.S.C.). The current version of the Bankruptcy Code was
originally enacted in 1978, see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92
Stat. 2549, and has been amended several times.
21 See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 761 (D.
Minn. 2006) (involving a constitutional challenge to BAPCPA); Hersh v. United
States, 347 B.R. 19, 21 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (same). These and other cases asserting the
unconstitutionality of certain features of BAPCPA are discussed supra Part VI.A.
22 See infra Part IV.C. See generally Lipson, Churches, supra note 6 (exploring the
doctrinal and constitutional dilemmas posed by the bankruptcies of several Catholic
dioceses).
23 Indeed, this Article is just the first step in that much larger project.
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point is to identify a theme in the treatment of these questions and to
make some suggestions about how to address this theme. The theme
that emerges from a broader analysis of constitutional problems in
bankruptcy is "bankruptcy exceptionalism." Bankruptcy exceptionalism
has been an operating principle in the creation and development of
the bankruptcy power since the Framing. It has several distinct, but
related, meanings which help to explain some of the puzzles noted
above.
For example, exceptionalism fills in some pieces of the organic
puzzle. The Framers may have constitutionalized bankruptcy not to
create permanent bankruptcy law, but only to enable Congress to
respond to extraordinary-that is, exceptional-circumstances, such
as financial busts. Exceptionalism also describes how we have
addressed (although perhaps not solved) some of the structural puz-
zles noted above. For example, bankruptcy jurisdiction appears to be
exceptionally broad vis-A-vis the states, and exceptionally complex vis-
A-vis other components of the federal government. Similarly, bank-
ruptcy appears to result in exceptions to conventional notions about
the treatment of a variety of constitutional protections involving,
among others, property, due process, and religious liberty. This may
explain why bankruptcy is, to some, 'just special" as a constitutional
matter.2
4
To say that bankruptcy often generates constitutional anomalies
is not, however, to say that it should. Exceptionalism's broader impli-
cation is troubling. Many have observed that our Constitution-and
perhaps our nation-are "exceptional. ' 25 This might be benign, in
24 See Richard Leib, State Sovereign Immunity: Bankruptcy Is Special, 14 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV 201, 203 (2006).
25 See Osmar J. Benvenuto, Note, Reevaluating the Debate Surrounding the Supreme
Court's Use of Foreign Precedent, 74 FoRIDHAM L. REV. 2695, 2736-37 (2006) (collecting
and discussing authorities on exceptionalism). "Exceptionalism" is often associated
with claims about national identity. It is "l[t] he idea that America occupies a place in
history significantly different from that of any other country in the world." Dorothy
Ross, American Exceptionalism, in A COMPANION TO AMERICAN THOUGHT 22, 22 (Rich-
ard Wightman Fox & James T. Kloppenberg eds., 1995). Exceptionalism is thought
to be a product of an alleged absence of a feudal past, a strong preference for individ-
ual rights and nongovernmental association, and/or the breadth and wealth (at least
for a time) of the frontier. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 36
(Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. Chi. Press 2000).
Although sometimes considered a pejorative term, it has features that some see as
positive. See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
1487 (2003) ("Looking only at [negative aspects of American exceptionalism]
obscures the most important respect in which the United States has been genuinely
exceptional, with regard to international affairs, international law, and promotion of
human rights: namely, in its exceptional global leadership and activism.").
2008l
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the same way that we say that all the children of Lake Wobegon are
above average. But it might also be unprincipled. If we are excep-
tional, the reasoning goes, then we are unique. And, if we are unique,
we need not be governed by others'-or even our own-rules. 26 To
say that bankruptcy is exceptional recognizes the potential for a kind
of constitutional ad hocery that many would find disturbing.
Thus, the important questions will require us to explain why we
have tolerated this exceptionalism in bankruptcy, whether it is a good
thing, and how far it should go. A constitutional theory of bankruptcy
should answer these questions by defining the breadth and depth of
the bankruptcy power in relation to other constitutional rules, stan-
dards, norms, and values. Although no single article can do this, this
Article does suggest two things that a tractable constitutional theory of
bankruptcy should account for.
First, if bankruptcy produces exceptional constitutional results, it
may be due in part to its unique location on the public-private contin-
uum. We have come to view bankruptcy as a problem of "private"
rights-that is, rights at property, contract, and tort, which typically
arise under state law and which, for convenience, I will call "state pri-
vate law." But this has distracted us from bankruptcy's uniquely com-
plex mix of public and private rights and responsibilities. Bankruptcy
constitutes a significantly public mechanism for the creation and
destruction of a whole host of private rights, including those that are
creatures of state private law. Indeed, its greatest power-the dis-
charge of debt-can be seen as the conversion of a private right (a
debt claim) into a public one (a permanent injunction against its
collection).
The public reach of the bankruptcy power is at once the most
difficult and the most important question we can address when con-
sidering the constitutional dimensions of bankruptcy. So far as the
Supreme Court is concerned, the "core" of the bankruptcy power is
the "restructuring of debtor-creditor relations."27 The problem with
this is that most relationships can be reduced to debtor and creditor,
and "restructuring" implies too many degrees of freedom. Virtually
anything. could be justified as within the power to restructure debtor-
creditor relations, and that obviously is not acceptable.
While reasonable minds can differ on the constitutive elements of
the bankruptcy power, and thus what is within and without its scope,
26 Segenerally Koh, supra note 25, at 1480-87 (cataloguing the negative aspects of
exceptionalism).
27 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
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for purposes of this Article, I will suggest four28 : (1) the power to halt
intercreditor disputes over a debtor's assets; (2) the power to collect
and distribute a debtor's assets; (3) the power to punish misconduct
by debtors, creditors, or others who harm creditors by, for example,
hiding a debtor's assets; and (4) the power to reward the "honest but
unfortunate" debtor 29 with a discharge of debt. This last power is the
most controversial, for it penetrates most deeply into privately
ordered relations. It implies that we have, in the bankruptcy power,
constitutionally sanctioned the violation of rights arising-and other-
wise enforceable-at state private law.
These public powers should not go unchecked. Thus, a second
major goal of this Article is to identify constitutional rules, standards,
norms, and values that constrain these powers. In particular, the Arti-
cle identifies certain democratic and countermajoritarian protections
that have been built into bankruptcy as it is practiced. Thus, while
judicial decisionmaking is obviously not democratic, certain key fea-
tures of the bankruptcy process-for example, the election of Chap-
ter 730 and Chapter 1131 trustees-depend on rightsholder (e.g.,
creditor) voting. We may tolerate some of the economic violence
done by bankruptcy because it is supported by a democratic infra-
28 This list builds on, among other things, the taxonomy proposed by Louis
Levinthal. See Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L.
REv. 223, 225 (1918) ("All bankruptcy law... no matter when or where devised and
enacted, has at least two general objects in view.... [It] seeks to protect the creditors,
first, from one another and, secondly, from their debtor. A third object, the protec-
tion of the honest debtor from his creditors, by means of the discharge, is sought to
be attained in some of the systems of bankruptcy, but this is by no means a fundamen-
tal feature of the law."). A somewhat similar taxonomy of colonial bankruptcy laws
appears in PETERJ. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 12-13 (1974).
29 This character is often associated with language in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234 (1934): "[The bankruptcy law] gives to the honest but unfortunate
debtor.., a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by
the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." Id. at 244. As discussed below,
this hypothetical character has been around for some time. Blackstone explained
that England's bankruptcy law would not "confine an honest bankrupt after his effects
[were] delivered up" to creditors. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *473. As
Harrison Gray Otis, an important member of the Federalist party and early United
States Representative, stated in 1799 debates about proposed bankruptcy legislation:
"'[W] e should give to creditors a control over the property of their debtors, so as to
stop the fraudulent in their career, and we should rescue the honest but unfortunate
insolvent from the oppression of a vindictive creditor."' See MANN, supra note 1, at
212 (quoting 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2675 (1799) (statement of Rep. Otis)). As devel-
oped in Parts II and V, below, I believe this character's normative contours are central
to understanding the reach of the bankruptcy power.
30 11 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
31 Id. § 1104(b) (1).
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structure. Conversely, bankruptcy has also developed important coun-
termajoritarian creditor protections, including protections for
priorities established under state private law.
What is at stake here? We have already seen constitutional chal-
lenges to BAPCPA, the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. In
the longer term, we can easily imagine Congress tempted to further
amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide relief for those caught in the
subprime mortgage lending "bubble."3 2 There are also likely to be
more religious entities seeking bankruptcy relief.33 These, and many
other legal responses to financial distress, present important and
underappreciated challenges to constitutional ordering.34
32 This may already be in process. According to a recent New York Times article,
Illinois Senator Richard Durbin, the Democratic Whip, plans to propose amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code in a bill called the Helping Families Avoid Foreclosure Act,
that would, among other things, permit writing down loans and stretching out pay-
ment terms. See Steve Lohr, Loan by Loan, the Making of a Credit Squeeze, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2007, § 3, at 7.
33 As of this writing, the most recent diocese to declare bankruptcy is that of San
Diego, California. See Greg Moran, Complex Legal Issues Will Accompany Filing, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 28, 2007, at Al.
34 The full list of other constitutional issues that might be raised by bankruptcy is
too long to recite. It would, however, include questions about the right to ajury trial
in bankruptcy, see Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 64-65 (1989) (hold-
ing that the jury trial right is preserved for a fraudulent conveyance defendant who
has not filed a proof of claim); First Amendment protections for political or media
debtors, see, e.g., 1992 Republican Senate-House Dinner Comm. v. Carolina's Pride
Seafood, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 243, 246-47 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the First Amend-
ment is not a defense to a constructive fraudulent conveyance claim), vacated, 158
F.R.D. 223 (D.D.C. 1994); and the prohibition on debt peonage, see Bailey v. Ala-
bama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (observing that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
all kinds of "slavery," including performing labor in payment of a debt). Moreover,
debt has played an unusually important role in many constitutional decisions, from
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 331-32 (1819) (establishing congres-
sional power to create a national bank), to Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improve-
ment Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 283-84 (1856) (setting forth important parameters
of the judicial power), to Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (holding
that a dispute about the effect of cancellation of indebtedness would be resolved not
by state law, but instead by the one 'just" rule of consideration applicable to all com-
mercial cases in federal courts). Indeed, managing debt-related disputes has often
been a critical component of the work of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
established the "common law" of negotiability, see Mandeville v. Joseph Riddle & Co.,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 290, 295-97 (1803), and the greatest bulk of its work in the mid-
nineteenth century involved questions about the enforceability of municipal bonds
issued to finance the growth of the railroads. See 6 CHAR.LEs FAMiAN, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION pt. I, at 920
(1971) ('"Probably no question in American jurisprudence has been more persist-
ently and thoroughly litigated than the validity of municipal bonds in aid of rail-
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explains why existing bank-
ruptcy theory does not adequately address constitutional problems in
bankruptcy and the work that a constitutional theory of bankruptcy
can-and cannot-do. Parts II-IV describe the organic, structural,
and substantive puzzles and exceptionalism that permeate the consti-
tutional problems of bankruptcy. Part V offers thoughts on what an
effective constitutional theory of bankruptcy should account for. Part
VI concludes by considering what is really at stake in certain present
or developing controversies, and how the foregoing discussion can
enrich our understanding of these difficult problems-in the process
pointing us to better solutions.
I. WHY A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY?
Why have a constitutional theory of bankruptcy? Its presence in
the Constitution alone-although odd-is not itself grounds to
develop a theory. After all, the Constitution gives Congress the enu-
merated power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, ' 35 and for-
bids it from granting titles of nobility.36 We appear to have survived
without broad constitutional theories of those or other similarly trivial
features of the Constitution.3 7 Nor is it obvious why bankruptcy
problems are sufficiently important to warrant deeper constitutional
theorizing. Laurence Tribe, in what is perhaps our definitive treatise
roads.'" (quoting JAMES A. BUtRHANS, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 19 (Chi. & N.Y.,
S.A. Kean & Co. 1889))). The problems of debt and democracy go well beyond those
of bankruptcy alone, although these and other related issues exceed the scope of this
Article.
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. This provision has received occasional attention
as it relates to Congress' power to declare war. SeeJules Lobel, Covert War and Congres-
sional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035, 1040 (1986)
(arguing that the Constitution requires that paramilitary activities abroad be under-
taken only with congressional authorization pursuant to the Marque and Reprisal
Clause); Charles A. Lofgrent, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 696 (1972); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers,
69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1543, 1618 (2002) (arguing that the Clause only refers to "the
specific measure of forcible seizure of foreign property in redress of a prior wrong").
36 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Richard Delgado has argued
for a revival of the Antinobility Clauses as a way to remedy injuries that are not
reached under the Equal Protection Clause. See Richard Delgado, Inequality "From the
Top ": Applying an Ancient Prohibition to an Emerging Problem of Distributive Justice, 32
UCLA L. REv. 100, 102 (1984). Christopher Eisgruber uses the Clauses in a different
way, arguing that they exemplify a general constitutional principle: prohibiting gov-
ernment authority from creating "caste-based factions." See Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Political Unity and the Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1297, 1302 (1994).
37 For a discussion of constitutional inanities, seeJ.M. Balkin, The Constitution as a
Box of Chocolates, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (1995).
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on the Constitution, devotes two paragraphs to the subject-out of
1381 pages of text.3 8 Moreover, there are plenty of other important
federal subjects-for example, antitrust, internal revenue, securities
regulation, and intellectual property-for which we have not gener-
ated broad constitutional theories. 39 What, if anything, makes bank-
ruptcy special?
Two things. First, from the Framing, bankruptcy has presented a
number of puzzles. Questions involving the breadth and depth of the
bankruptcy power approach the core of the Constitution's capacity to
affect private ordering. These questions will likely grow more urgent
as the systems in which the power operates become more complex.
38 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-8, at 846-48 (3d ed.
2000). Of the scores of serious constitutional scholars who populate United States law
schools, only one, Erwin Chemerinsky, appears to have devoted any significant energy
to understanding the constitutional dynamics of bankruptcy. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Decision-Makers: In Defense Of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 124-30 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Chemerinsky, Courts] (discussing the practical and jurisdictional implications of
bankruptcy courts being Article I as opposed to Article III courts); Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time To Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J.
311, 311-17 (1991) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Marathon] (arguing in part that the
"Constitution should not be interpreted as forbidding Article I bankruptcy courts
from hearing state claims"). See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 6 (analyzing consti-
tutional questions relating to BAPCPA). Some others discuss bankruptcy in passing,
usually as it relates to questions of state sovereign immunity, see Kathleen M. Sullivan,
From States' Rights Blues to Blue States'Rights: Federalism After the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 799, 805 (2006) (discussing Katz as a circumvention of earlier decisions),
or the relationship between Article I and Article III powers, see, e.g., Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REV.
915, 933 (1988); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial
Power of the United States, 118 HARv. L. REV. 643, 672-89 (2004) (distinguishing Article
I "tribunals" from Article III "courts"). These latter works usually recruit bankruptcy
to address other constitutional questions, and do not engage bankruptcy or broader
questions of financial distress in any systematic way.
39 There are, of course, many thoughtful discussions of the constitutional impli-
cations of the regulatory effectuation of these and many other enumerated federal
powers. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker & Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Con-
stitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 52 (1972) (discussing the tax-
exempt status and the allowable charitable deduction for fraternal orders and social
clubs that discriminate on the basis of race, religion, nationality, sex, and political
affiliation); James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 277-81 (1989)
(discussing antitrust law in terms of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century lais-
sez-faire constitutionalism); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional
Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004); Symposium, The First Amendment and Federal
Securities Regulations, 20 CONN. L. REV. 261 (1988). My claim is not that these other
fields lack constitutional analysis. Rather, it is to focus attention on the underap-
preciated constitutional problems that bankruptcy creates.
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Second, existing bankruptcy theory has not defined the parameters of
this power, and thus has not seriously engaged these puzzles. Rather,
the dominant debates in bankruptcy literature for the past several
generations have been normative and concerned chiefly with bank-
ruptcy as a problem of private ordering.
This Part has two goals. First, it summarizes this literature, which
can be seen as forming a continuum. At one end are those who tend
to view bankruptcy as a set of federal procedures wrapped around-
and limited by-a state private law core. At the other end are those
who view bankruptcy as involving a much broader set of legislative
powers and possibilities. 40 Second, and more generally, this Part
describes what a constitutional theory can-and cannot-do for
bankruptcy.
A. The Bankruptcy Theory Continuum
Bankruptcy theory is informed by a rich and lively literature
debating the proper normative goals of bankruptcy policy. At one
end of the spectrum are proceduralists, who argue, in essence, that
bankruptcy law should be viewed as a process that sorts out nonban-
kruptcy entitlements, which are largely creatures of state private law.
41
This position is chiefly associated with Thomas Jackson's 1982 article
on the so-called "creditors' bargain," in which he argued that the
appropriate way to view the bankruptcy system was from the perspec-
tive of the deal that creditors would have chosen for themselves had
they been in a position to do so before the debtor's bankruptcy.
42
Thus, "bankruptcy law should make a fundamental decision to honor
40 Whether bankruptcy theory more accurately forms a "continuum" or a set of
"camps" is open to debate. Professor Baird has noted that bankruptcy theoreticians
can be clustered into two groups, "traditionalists" and "proceduralists." See Douglas
G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 576-77 (1998) ("[T]here
are two distinct camps. In the first are traditional bankruptcy lawyers and scholars
whose views are largely reflected in the recent report of the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission.... The [second] group's distinctive characteristic is its focus on
procedure ...."). I prefer to characterize the debate as a continuum for a variety of
reasons, including that there are many subtle differences among writers about their
normative aspirations for bankruptcy. With few exceptions, however,.those writing on
this continuum appear reluctant to engage seriously the constitutional dimensions of
their positions, whatever they may be.
41 See id. ("The second group [in the bankruptcy policy debates] consists almost
entirely of academics .... The group's distinctive characteristic is its focus on proce-
dure and its belief that a coherent bankruptcy law must recognize how it fits into both
the rest of the legal system and a vibrant market economy.").
42 Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
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negotiated non-bankruptcy entitlements. ' 43 Bankruptcy law should
be viewed chiefly as a procedural mechanism for solving the collective
action problem that arises upon insolvency. Bankruptcy law, on the
proceduralist model, does not say who should bear the loss. That
question will be answered by other-chiefly state-law.
Proceduralists have tended to avoid the constitutional dimen-
sions of their position. For example, Douglas Baird, in questioning
the wisdom of the Supreme Court's controversial decisions in the
Northern Pipeline"4 and Gibbons45 cases, concluded that the defects ulti-
mately were normative, not constitutional. 46 The "greatest concern
[of bankruptcy law] ," he argued, "is that the procedure by which state-
created rights are recognized is fair."47 This was not a constitutional
mandate, however. "Although the creation of some substantive rights
may be within the scope of Congress' power, they turn away from the
central purpose of bankruptcy law, a purpose that is served, in the first
instance, by creating procedural rules rather than substantive
rights."' 48 The important question for most proceduralists is not
whether Congress has power under the Bankruptcy Clause, but what
should be done with it.
Professor Mooney has recently advanced the proceduralist pro-
ject by explicitly characterizing it as a species of civil procedure, and
therefore identifying it with some of the constitutional trappings of
our procedural system. 49 If, as this model holds, losses are to be deter-
mined by state private law, then just as Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins50
stripped United States district courts of the power to "make" federal
common law when sitting in diversity, 51 so too should bankruptcy
43 Id. at 871. An "enhanced" version of the creditors' bargain model, which
attempted to respond to some of its critics, appears in Thomas H.Jackson & Robert E.
Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors'Bar-
gain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989).
44 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982)
(striking down the jurisdictional grant of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act); see infra Part
III.B.
45 Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) (striking
down the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act); see infra Part
V.B.
46 See Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure, supra note 6, at 45.
47 Id. at 47.
48 Id.
49 Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is)
Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 934 (2004).
50 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts must apply state law as deter-
mined by the state's highest court in diversity actions).
51 Id. at 78-80.
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courts be constrained from "making" law where Congress was without
power to act.52 Mooney is obviously focused chiefly on cases where a
bankruptcy court might wish to make interstitial law, arguing that this
should be impermissible on a variety of normative grounds. But he
suggests by analogy that the Bankruptcy Clause does not empower
Congress to trump much of state private law.
53
Although not overtly a proceduralist, Professor Plank has argued
that analogous constraints apply to the bankruptcy power, rooted in
historical analysis of the Bankruptcy Clause. He has argued that the
Bankruptcy Clause only empowers Congress to "regulate[] the rela-
tionship between an insolvent debtor and her creditors. '54 This in
turn implies two constraints: first, that a debtor be "insolvent" in some
sense, and second that "the law may not create direct entitlements or
liabilities for parties other than debtors and their creditors." 55 Thus,
according to Professor Plank, Congress may not use the Bankruptcy
Clause to regulate debtor-creditor relations generally, to give creditors
rights not available at state private law, or to diminish rights of parties
other than the insolvent debtor or creditors. 56 Insolvency, state pri-
vate law, and the debtor-creditor relationship form the constitutional
boundaries of the bankruptcy power in Professor Plank's model.
57
52 Mooney, supra note 49, at 995-96 ("'Erie's declaration'" meant that "'federal
courts should not, without compelling reason, displace state rules with those of their
own making because Congress had not passed legislation to cover the facts of Erie.'
(quoting EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 177
(2000))); see also Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 633, 644 (2004) ("[I1n the case of Congress's Bankruptcy Power, the primary
meaning of Erie retains significant force.").
53 See Mooney, supra note 49, at 998 ("[C]odification of the Swif doctrine would
be no more coherent and no more just than was the judge-made Swift doctrine
itself.").
54 See Plank, Limits, supra note 6, at 491-92.
55 Id. at 492.
56 Plank, Federalism, supra note 6, at 1091-92 & nn.107-12.
57 On Professor Plank's theory, some features of the current system may be
outside the scope of the bankruptcy power. For example, the Bankruptcy Code con-
tains no requirement that a debtor be insolvent to commence a bankruptcy case, and
there are famous, if rare, examples of solvent debtors seeking bankruptcy protection.
See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 729-30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(involving a debtor corporation that commenced a bankruptcy case when still solvent
in order to address potential future liabilities)]. Nor does state private law generally
give creditors or third parties a variety of rights available in bankruptcy. For example,
state private law does not generally give creditors or third parties the right to propose
or vote on a plan of reorganization, to replace a debtor's management, or to seek a
debtor's liquidation.
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The proceduralist vision has been hotly contested, from its
assumptions 58 to its method and logic. 59 Yet no elegant theory has
been proposed to supplant it. Rather, at the other end of the contin-
uum, we find a loose collection of academics and practitioners who
argue that bankruptcy embraces complex, "competing-and some-
times conflicting-values" and aspirations over which Congress
should have the power to legislate. 60 A theme, however, is that those
at this other end of the continuum would generally give Congress and
bankruptcy courts greater power to adjust debtor-creditor relations
than would proceduralists.
On this statist view, bankruptcy policy involves many different
approaches to the basic question of how losses should be distributed.
Losses may be distributed by agreement of the parties (for example,
secured credit), by state law (for example, exemptions and lien laws),
or by positive bankruptcy law (for example, special priorities built into
the Bankruptcy Code protecting, inter alia, grain farmers and fisher-
men 61). The statist position is thus that Congress has largely unre-
strained power to make positive bankruptcy law, even to trample state
private law, of which proceduralists would probably be much more
protective. 62 Statists would presumably permit Congress to legislate in
such traditional spheres of state law as the creation of liens on per-
sonal property.
63
58 See, e.g., Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38
VAND. L. REV. 713, 827 (1985) ("[Jackson and other proponents of the creditors' bar-
gain model] assume that every creditor-apparendy including asbestos victims and
other tort claimants . . .- will have full information and competent legal advice in
dealing with the debtor. They assume further that every creditor will make the same
assumptions they do and bring to bear their same highly skilled free market economic
analysis .... I do not find their approach helpful .... ).
59 See generally David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1341
(1987) (reviewing THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE Locic AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
(1986)). Carlson strongly criticizes the creditors' bargain model on which Jackson's
work heavily relies, asserting that, "at his best, Jackson rises to mere tautology.
Beyond that, Jackson entangles himself in unreconciled contradictions and depends
upon factual assertions that no one could accept as true." Id. at 1342.
60 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1987).
61 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a) (6) (West Supp. 2007).
62 David Gray Carlson early on recognized that the principles that should govern
the scope of the bankruptcy power would look not to market economics but instead
to federalism. Carlson, supra note 59, at 1348 ("Federalization of debtor-creditor law
has to be justified by principles that are closer to the logic of diversity jurisdiction
than to the logic of profit maximization.").
63 See, e.g., David M. Phillips, Secured Credit and Bankruptcy: A Call for the Federaliza-
tion of Personal Property Security Law, LAW & CoNTEMp. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 53, 57
(1987) ("Congress's power to pass bankruptcy legislation would, in itself, surely sup-
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While the statist position would assume greater congressional
authority to legislate in bankruptcy (and probably greaterjudicial dis-
cretion to act in the absence of positive law), it has not yet coalesced
into a deeper theory of the constitutional limitations on bankruptcy.
The best that scholars have been able to do is to develop important
empirical insights into what actually occurs when businesses become
financially distressed, 64 and to make tentative stabs at incorporating
alternative theories. Professor Korobkin, for example, has urged that
bankruptcy involves more than "mere property."65 Rather, bank-
ruptcy "provides a forum in which competing and various interests
and values accompanying financial distress may be expressed and
sometimes recognized." 66 Any number of competing values may lead
a legislature to enact a federal bankruptcy law that purports to address
this problem. Courts should, according to statists, have great flexibil-
ity in crafting bankruptcy rules and standards to address these
values.
67
These debates have produced a rich and fascinating literature. It
would not, however, appear that most of those involved in these
debates have fully contemplated the constitutional implications of
their policy positions. Proceduralists would tell us that Congress'
power to legislate under the Bankruptcy Clause should eschew creat-
ing or destroying "substantive" rights, which should be determined
largely by state private law.68 The problem is that the proceduralist
logic breaks down when the prebankruptcy entitlements in question
are provided or protected by the Constitution. What should happen
in bankruptcy when state private law is shielded, altered, or enhanced
port the specific suggestion of this article to federalize personal property security law
and integrate it with the Bankruptcy Code." (footnote omitted)).
64 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669,
677-753 (1993); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1207-54 (2005).
65 Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 717, 745 (1991).
66 Id. at 766.
67 See id. at 774-75.
68 This is not to say that the proceduralist logic is always consistent. Professor
Jackson, for example, has famously argued in favor of the individual debtor's right to
a fresh start, which would tolerate the destruction of many state private law rights at
contract, tort, and, to a lesser extent, property. See Thomas H.Jackson, The Fresh-Start
Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1985). As with his Creditors'
Bargain article,Jackson here is not making constitutional claims, only normative ones.
See id. at 1394 ("[N]o one thus far has developed a comprehensive normative theory
of the right of discharge .... ").
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by a constitutional gloss? The Constitution may give special dignity to
certain types of state private law-for example, property-or to cer-
tain types of participants-for example, religious actors or entities.
When the Constitution materially affects state private law-or creates
rights independent of state private law-how would a proceduralist
choose?
Statists would probably tell us that Congress has much greater
power to legislate under the Bankruptcy Clause, and would point to
the many features of existing law that do, in fact, substantively alter
state-created property and contract rights, including, most impor-
tantly, the discharge of indebtedness. But the statist position would
have trouble helping us identify a stopping point. It would also have
trouble selecting among competing values and norms when the com-
petition derives from a constitutional challenge. Recognizing that
bankruptcy is political does not necessarily tell judges what to do when
the instrument creating the polity is the subject of the dispute.
B. What Is Constitutional Theory Good For?
There may be a simple reason why bankruptcy theory debates
have largely ignored constitutional questions: they may not matter.
Constitutional theory is, after all, a matter of far greater self-serious-
ness than bankruptcy. 69 Constitutional theory invokes images of deep
thinking about the deep questions that face our nation and its distri-
bution of rights and responsibilities. Constitutional law-and theories
that might explain or determine it-are about matters of free speech,
the political franchise, invidious discrimination, chattel slavery, and
the proper dimensions of the organs of governance, among other
things. While bankruptcy theory may have its depths, they are
bounded by seemingly smaller questions of loss allocation and prop-
erty distribution.
The world is in no obvious need of more constitutional theory.
There is already plenty to go around. There are, among others,
originalists (both "hard"70 and "soft"71 ), textualists, 72 proceduralists, 7
3
69 Robert Bork is sometimes characterized as the proponent of the idea that con-
stitutional law must be grounded in some sort of "theory." See Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1971) (arguing that "[a]
persistently disturbing aspect of constitutional law is its lack of theory" and describing
"the necessity for theory").
70 Hard originalism is usually associated with the writing of Raoul Berger, Robert
Bork, and Justice Scalia. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 365 (1977)
(noting the "prevailing distrust of unbounded judicial interpretive discretion" during
the founding era); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 352 (1990) ("Once
adherence to the original understanding is weakened or abandoned, ajudge, perhaps
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constructivists,74 institutionalists, 75 minimalists, 76 and perfectionists. 77
There are so many theories of the Constitution, it is not completely
clear what a "constitutional theory" is actually supposed to accom-
plish. 78 So, what do I mean by "constitutional theory," and what work
would a constitutional theory of bankruptcy do that is not already per-
formed either by existing theory-or by no theory at all?
I mean "theory" in the sense Lawrence Lessig does: constitutional
theory should be a "tool for cutting off senseless parts, when parts of
the practice become senseless [and] a tool for revealing the senseless
in a practice when the senseless is otherwise unseen. '7 9 Constitutional
theory should not purport to produce "a general formula, or equa-
instructed by a revisionist theorist, can reach any result ...."); Antonin Scalia, Com-
mon-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting
the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 45 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997) (stating that "the difficulties and uncertainties of determining original mean-
ing and applying it to modern circumstances are negligible compared with the diffi-
culties and uncertainties of the philosophy which says that the Constitution
changes").
71 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. REv. 204, 205, 214 (1980) (describing the link between textualism and original
intent and distinguishing these from "moderate" originalism as an interest in "the
framers' intent on a relatively abstract level of generality"); Cass R. Sunstein, Five The-
ses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 311, 313 (1996) (describing a "soft
originalist" as one who "will take the Framers' understanding to a certain level of
abstraction or generality"). More recent and sophisticated versions of originalism are
discussed infra Part II.B.2.
72 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 16 (1980) ("[T]he most
important datum bearing on what was intended is the constitutional language
itself.").
73 See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HAv. L. REv. 1, 2-10 (1959).
74 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1189, 1240-43 (1987).
75 See, e.g., ADRIEN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 63-85 (2006).
76 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 25-30, 35-37 (2005).
77 See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 16 (2006).
78 See Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitu-
tional Theory Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1838-39 (1997) ("In the recent past, [consti-
tutional theory] has done too much. The language of constitutional theory is now
unspeakable by practitioners of constitutional law-unspeakable both in the sense of
not being understood and in the sense of not contributing to real debates about con-
stitutional law."). On the growing gap between theory and practice, see Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34, 42-57 (1992).
79 Lessig, supra note 78, at 1838.
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tion, from which we are to deduce particular cases. '80 Rather, a con-
stitutional theory of bankruptcy should remain "low down, near the
data."81 A constitutional theory of bankruptcy, as any other constitu-
tional theory, can "help us to work around interpretive puzzles.
'82 It
can be "a way to make sense of our practice at particularly difficult
times."
8 3
The constitutional theory towards which I aim would help con-
nect bankruptcy-and the constitutional problems it encounters-to
other constitutional rules, standards, norms, and values. It is not a
unified field theory of bankruptcy or constitutional law, but a descrip-
tion of what is-and should be-behind the constitutional choices
bankruptcy inevitably forces us to make on occasion. Neither bank-
ruptcy theory nor constitutional theory has yet revealed the deeper
patterns and connections between the two that distinguish the sensi-
ble from the senseless. The balance of this Article is an early attempt
to do so.
II. ORGANIC PUZZLES; ORGANIC EXCEPTIONALISM
Bankruptcy and the challenges of regulating financial distress
have, over the years, presented three classes of constitutional puzzles:
organic, structural, and substantive. Each puzzle has, to a greater or
lesser degree, been addressed in what can be characterized as "excep-
tional" ways. This Part and the next two Parts identify these puzzles,
and the exceptionalism attending each.
A. Why a Bankruptcy Clause?
The very presence of a bankruptcy power in the Constitution
raises a host of questions: Why does our Constitution have a Bank-
ruptcy Clause? What work would it do that some combination of the
Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Supremacy Clauses could not
have accomplished? The operative terms-"uniform" and "bankrupt-
cies"-had specific, "peculiar" meanings in the 1780s.8 4 Why would
80 Id. at 1847; see also Lawrence Lessig, Erie -Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Con-
text in Interpretive Theoy, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1785, 1811 (1997) (suggesting that "[m]ost
constitutional theory . . .underplays the role of context"); Lawrence Lessig, Under-
standing Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 426-38 (1995)
(describing the "Erie effect" in which longstanding legal traditions are challenged and
ultimately replaced).
81 Lessig, supra note 78, at 1838.
82 Id. at 1847.
83 Id.
84 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819) ("The peculiar
terms of the grant certainly deserve notice."). Of course, by the time of Sturges, the
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we have chosen such arguably narrow terms, with virtually no debate,
especially when their accepted meaning may have presented problems
for tnose Framers who happened to be debtors? And should Congress
today be bound by this narrower construction of the bankruptcy
power?
This subpart identifies puzzles in the origin of the Bankruptcy
Clause, and suggests that its original understanding may be explained
as a kind of exceptionalism in three different ways. First, the bank-
ruptcy power may not have been intended to create permanent law,
but only an in terrorem power, to deter the states, which would in the
first instance make the private law that would establish debtor-creditor
relations, from legislating too aggressively in favor of either debtors or
creditors, or in any way that had the potential to disturb a nationwide
balance of private economic ordering. Rather, the Bankruptcy Clause
would create a power to be used, if at all, in exigent-that is, excep-
tional-circumstances. Second, our current, expanded construction
of the bankruptcy power requires a deviation from-or exception
to-originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation. Third, the
original understanding of the bankruptcy power has been used to cre-
ate an important exception to conventional ways of construing the
effect of later amendments to the Constitution on earlier provisions.
1. The Puzzling Origins
As ratified, the Bankruptcy Clause provides that "Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o establish .. . uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States."85 Little is known about
its legislative history.8 6 It was apparently added late in the proceed-
ings of the Constitutional Convention, "after very little debate."87
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina was said to be its drafter.88 Only
Connecticut voted against it.89 It was approved along with the Full
Court concluded that the terms "bankruptcy" and "insolvency" were interchangeable.
See id. at 140-45. It is not apparent that the Framers would have shared that view.
85 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
86 James Olmstead devotes a single paragraph to its history. SeeJames M. Olm-
stead, Bankruptcy a Commercial Regulation, 15 HARv. L. REv. 829, 831 (1902).
87 Tabb, supra note 10, at 13. "What prompted Pinckney to raise these new issues
is unknown. There is no record of any delegate even uttering the word 'bankruptcy'
before this." MANN, supra note 1, at 183.
88 See Tabb, supra note 10, at 13.
89 Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 Am. J. LEGAL HIST.
215, 216-17 (1957).
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Faith and Credit Clause.90 Its purpose has often been derived from
Madison's discussion in The Federalist.
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so inti-
mately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will pre-
vent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or
be removed into different states that the expediency of it seems not
likely to be drawn into question.9 1
While Madison, in Bruce Mann's words, "skipped lightly over the
clause, '9 2 there was in fact considerable confusion and concern about
bankruptcy and insolvency at the time. The confusion derived from
the bewildering array of colonial laws that existed at the time. Some
colonies had "insolvency" laws, which would enable a debtor to be
freed from debtor's prison, but which would not discharge the under-
lying debt obligations, the default of which led to imprisonment in
the first place. 93 Some colonies, such as Pennsylvania, also had "bank-
ruptcy" laws which actually enabled the debtor to discharge his
debts. 94  These laws were frequently repealed, reenacted, and
amended. 95 Indeed, as Peter Coleman has observed:
At the time of the Revolution, only three of the thirteen colonies-
Rhode Island and the two Carolinas-had laws discharging insol-
vents of their debts. No two of these relief systems were alike in
anything but spirit. In four of the other ten colonies, insolvency
legislation was either never enacted or, if enacted, never went into
effect, and in the remaining six colonies, full relief was available
only for scattered, brief periods, usually on an ad hoc basis to named
insolvents.
96
Compounding the confusing state of the law were concerns about
the serious financial crises of the time.9 7 These crises pitted creditors
against debtors. Often, they were one and the same-meaning X may
90 See MANN, supra note 1, at 183.
91 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 278 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
92 MANN, supra note 1, at 187. Justice Story observed in the 1830s that "[t]he
brevity[] with which this subject is treated by the Federalist is quite remarkable." 2
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1105, at 47 (photo. reprint
1994) (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1891).
93 See MANN, supra note 1, at 80.
94 See id. at 177-78 ("The Pennsylvania statute was a true bankruptcy act. It
offered the holy grail of debt relief-a discharge of unpaid debts-but only to com-
mercial debtors.").
95 See, e.g., id. at 179 ("New York... changed its insolvency system with breathtak-
ing frequency. .. ").
96 COLEMAN, supra note 28, at 14.
97 See MANN, supra note 1, at 176 ("Alongside the 'spirit of speculation' in the
1780s was a renewed acquaintance with failure.").
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have been both a creditor of Yand a debtor of Z. Z's ability to collect
might thus ultimately depend on Ys ability to pay X, even though Y
and Z had no direct relationship whatsoever. 98 Even in this relatively
simple time, debt created long and complex chains of relationships.
Making matters worse, many of the era's major debtors were also lead-
ers in the Revolution or Framers of the Constitution. Robert Morris
of Philadelphia was the "Superintendent of Finance" during the
Revolution,99 a signatory to the Constitution,100 and one of the
nation's wealthiest speculators thereafter, until his bubble burst and
he was locked up in Philadelphia's Prune Street Debtors' Prison in
1798.101 So, too, with James Wilson, "whose extensive speculations
had been a continuing distraction from his duties as an associate jus-
tice" of the Supreme Court. 10 2 He spent two weeks in debtors' prison
in December 1796.103
These confusions and concerns may explain why the Framers
would have wanted the power to create a nationwide law on financial
distress. But they do not necessarily explain why we have the Clause,
why it took its particular form, or why there was so little discussion of
it. The presence of the Clause is puzzling if we believe that the Consti-
tution already contained language sufficient to give Congress the
power to enact laws that would discharge debts on a uniform, nation-
wide basis. This may well have been the case. 10 4 There is, for exam-
ple, some support for the idea that "commerce" as originally
98 See id. at 188.
99 SeeJAMESJ. KIRSCHKE, GOUVERNEUR MORIUS 120 (2005).
100 See Frederick P. Corbit, The Founding Fathers' Influence on Bankruptcy Law, Am.
BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2007, at 50, 51.
101 See MANN, supra note 1, at 28. More than $3 million in claims were "proved"
against Morris in the bankruptcy case that was ultimately commenced against him. Id.
at 253. But his bankruptcy estate was "'so entangled and mortgaged.., that it [was]
the general opinion there [would] not be one penny in the pound."' Id.
102 Id. at 202.
103 Id.
104 See Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 111 (1989) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) ("I see no reason to treat Congress' power under the Bankruptcy
Clause any differently [than the Commerce Clause], for both constitutional provi-
sions give Congress plenary power over national economic activity."); Sacred Heart
Hosp. of Norristown v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown), 133
F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998) (observing that both the Bankruptcy Clause and Com-
merce Clause grant Congress "'plenary power over national economic activity'"
(quoting Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 111)). But see Plank, Limits, supra note 6, at 491-92
n.17 ("If... the Framers truly intended the Commerce Clause to authorize any legis-
lation that 'affected' interstate commerce or that enhanced the national economic
well being, there would have been no need for the Bankruptcy Clause.").
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understood included bankruptcy. 0 5 If Madison was correct, and
bankruptcy was so "intimately connected with the regulation of com-
merce," why did the Commerce Clause not do the job? Similarly, if
the Necessary and Proper Clause by itself could vest Congress with the
implied power to create a national bank,10 6 it would be reasonable to
imagine that it could achieve the Framers' (probably limited) bank-
ruptcy goals.
Nevertheless, the Clause was added, with its operative terms "uni-
form" and "bankruptcies." The latter is more important for present
purposes, because, as suggested above, "bankruptcy" laws were differ-
ent from "insolvency" laws, even if both dealt with financial distress. 10 7
The use of the term "bankruptcy" has suggested to many that the
Framers had in mind the English bankruptcy system and its con-
straints.10 8 But those constraints gave it "a distinctly pro-creditor ori-
entation." 109 English bankruptcy as it existed at the time of the
Framing was organized around three key factors: (1) a case could be
commenced only by and for the benefit of a creditor, not a debtor;110
(2) only against an insolvent "trader";"' and (3) only if the trader was
"honest but unfortunate."'1 12 As Blackstone explained, English law
would
105 See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control
over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17 (1999) (explaining that in the 1780s the term
.commerce" "had a specific, standard meaning-to enact rules to govern all gainful
activities, including subjects as diverse as trade, navigation, agriculture, manufactur-
ing, industry, mining, fisheries, building, employment, wages, prices, banking, insur-
ance, accounting, bankruptcy, business associations, securities, and bills of exchange."
(footnote omitted)). Of course, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), teaches
that the Commerce Clause does not create a "plenary police power." See id. at 566
(stating that the Constitution "withhold [s] from Congress a plenary police power that
would authorize enactment of every type of legislation").
106 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 373-74 (1819).
107 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
108 See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 10, at 6-7. Further evidence for this would come
from, among other things, the fact that "each year from 1789 to 1800, advocates of
national bankruptcy relief struggled to enact a measure based on English rather than
American practice." COLEMAN, supra note 28, at 18 (citations omitted). Presumably,
if the Framers intended some other form of law, they would have used the bankruptcy
power to propose and enact this other form.
109 Tabb, supra note 10, at 7.
110 13 Eliz., c. 7, § 1 (1510) (Eng.).
111 See id.; see also Tabb, supra note 10, at 9-10 (discussing how "bankruptcy
remained an involuntary remedy to be used ...only against debtors who were
merchant traders").
112 See supra note 29. Interestingly, the "dishonest" debtor was known to the
English as a "politic bankrupt." See W.J. Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy:
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allow the benefit of the laws of bankruptcy to none but actual trad-
ers, since that set of men are, generally speaking, the only persons
liable to accidental losses, and to an inability of paying their debts,
without any fault of their own. If persons in other situations of life
run in debt without the power of payment, they must take the con-
sequences of their own indiscretion, even though they meet with
sudden accidents that may reduce their fortunes: for the law holds it
to be an unjustifiable practice, for any person but a trader to
encumber himself with debts of any considerable value.1 13
The remedy proffered by English bankruptcy law, the discharge
of debt, was available only for debtors who "in all things conform led]"
(cooperated) with the bankruptcy process.'1 4 Neither farmers nor
artisans nor professionals (lawyers) could benefit from the dis-
charge. 1 15 This disparity troubled many in the Colonies, for whom
"[m] erchants were as rootless and unburdened by loyalty as the prom-
issory notes they put into circulation."
'" 6
Yet, it is also possible that the Framers did not in fact want to be
limited to the English model. The wide variations in colonial law, for
example, suggest one of two alternative stories about the Bankruptcy
Clause. On the one hand, it might be that they had in mind the more
debtor-friendly forms of relief enacted by certain colonies. Of particu-
lar interest here would be South Carolina, which was the home of
Charles Pinckney-again, said to be the drafter of the Clause'17-and
which was "the only colony south of Maryland to create a permanent
and full system of debtor relief." 18 South Carolina's bankruptcy law
of 1721, for example, authorized a full discharge for debtors (in par-
ticular, those in debtors' prison) who owed more than two pounds
sterling, but whose property was worth less than five pounds. 119 The
law was later amended to cover artisans and-perhaps more impor-
Statutes and Commissions in the Early Modern Period, TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. Soc'Y, July
1979, at 5, 9.
113 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *473.
114 4 Ann., c. 4, § 8 (1705) (Eng.) ("[A]ll and every Person and Persons so becom-
ing bankrupt ... who shall ... in all things conform ... shall be discharged from all
Debts by him her or them due and owing at the time that he she or they did become
Bankrupt.... .").
115 MANN, supra note 1, at 167-68.
116 Id.
117 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
118 COLEMAN, supra note 28, at 179.
119 Id. at 181.
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tantly-to discharge past debts.120 On the other hand, it is possible
that the wide array of unstable laws meant that the Framers could
form no consensus on the scope and meaning of the bankruptcy
power.
If, as conventional wisdom has it, the Framers had in mind the
English model of bankruptcy, it is puzzling: why would the Framers
have chosen to constitutionalize it, knowing that it may do some (the
debtors among them) no good, and perhaps real harm? Of course,
we do not know, because there is no meaningful record of discussion.
But this leads to another question: given the complexity and contro-
versy surrounding financial distress at the time, why was there no dis-
cussion? How could the Framers have been so blithe about the
provision, given the economic situation of the times and the circum-
stances of at least some of the Framers? As Mann explains:
[The] seeming nonchalance toward federalizing bankruptcy
stands in sharp contrast to how large the issue of debt loomed in the
1780s-or, more precisely, the issues of debt, for the debts that cast
such shadows over the decade were both public and private.
Although different in origin, public and private debts were inter-
twined in public imagination and debate and were linked more for-
mally by the medium of paper money. 121
The question becomes all the more perplexing when we remem-
ber that the first federal bankruptcy law was not enacted until 1800,
despite repeated attempts, and then lasted only until 1803, repealed
two years short of its scheduled sunset date.' 22 The nation would not
have another bankruptcy act until the equally ill-fated act of 1841.123
If a bankruptcy power was so obviously important that it had to be in
the Constitution, why could the nation not enact a durable law under
it until 1898124-109 years after ratification of the Clause?125
120 Id. at 182. Ultimately, this law was thought too easily abused and was further
amended in 1751 to authorize a full discharge for insolvents who obtained the con-
sent of three-fourths of their creditors by number and value. Id. at 184.
121 MANN, supra note 1, at 169.
122 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed ly Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6,
2 Stat. 248.
123 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82,
5 Stat. 614. There would be one more "temporary" bankruptcy act (of 1867) before
enactment of the "permanent" legislation under which we currently operate, the Act
of 1898. See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7,
1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
124 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Chandler Act, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000 & Supp. V
2005)).
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B. Organic Exceptionalism
1. The Exceptional and In Terrorem Bankruptcy Clause
The answer may be that the Framers understood the Bankruptcy
Clause to serve a more subtle purpose than we currently imagine-
one rooted in a kind of exceptionalism. Giving Congress the power to
sweep aside state bankruptcy (and perhaps insolvency) laws was not
the same thing as requiring Congress to use that power. Thus, absent
federal bankruptcy legislation, the states could, and did continue to,
enact bankruptcy and insolvency laws, without concerns about pre-
emption by a kind of "dormant bankruptcy clause."1 26 If the Framers
believed this would happen in the absence of federal bankruptcy law,
perhaps the purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause was to act as a threat to
those states that might wish to give extraordinary relief to debtors (or
creditors). Perhaps this was an attempt to preempt a state law race to
the bottom. A state can never be extreme in protecting debtors or
creditors, the Clause might really be saying, for if it is, Congress always
has the power to preempt the rogue state by imposing a uniform law.
Justice Story's Commentaries, while not contemporaneous with the
Framing, offer early support for this thesis. Without a federal bank-
ruptcy power, he observed:
One state may adopt a system of general insolvency; another, a lim-
ited or temporary system; one may relieve from the obligation of
contracts; another only from imprisonment; another may adopt a
still more restrictive course of occasional relief; and another may
refuse to act in any manner upon the subject. The laws of one state
may give undue preferences to one class of creditors, as for
instance, to creditors by bond, or judgment; another provide for
equality of debts, and a distribution pro rata .... In short, diversities
of almost infinite variety and object may be introduced into the
local system, which may work gross injustice and inequality, and
nourish feuds and discontents in neighboring states. 127
To prevent this competition, perhaps the Framers intended a
kind of in terrorem bankruptcy power. It would be used, if at all, only
in extreme-that is, exceptional-circumstances, but would always be
125 See Tabb, supra note 10, at 13-14 ("For over a century after the Constitu-
tion, . . . the Bankruptcy Clause [authority] remained largely unexercised by Con-
gress .... Thus, states were free to act in bankruptcy matters for all but 16 of the first
109 years after the Constitution was ratified.").
126 See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 192-97 (1819)
(involving a New York bankruptcy statute passed twenty-four years after the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution).
127 2 STORY, supra note 92, § 1107, at 49.
2008]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
there, a warning to would-be outlier states. This would explain why
the Framers thought it necessary to have something specific on the
subject. If it were left to the oblique interstices of the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses, the intended audience-the states-
would not necessarily get the message. This would also explain why
there was so little discussion. Would Pinckney, or any of the Framers,
want to be on record stating that the Clause was added at least in part
because the Framers did not trust the states-who were being asked to
ratify it?128 This would also tend to explain the spasmodic enactments
and repeals of bankruptcy laws for the nation's first 109 years: it was
never meant to create a permanent bankruptcy law-only exceptional
ones, and that is exactly what we got.
If this is correct, it is nevertheless subject to two observations.
First, it does not mean that the conventional explanation-Madison's
views about federalism-is incorrect. Indeed, the in terrorem potential
of the Bankruptcy Clause would tend to be a corollary to his claim that
uniformity across states was the motivating force in ratifying it. Sec-
ond, and more challenging, if the bankruptcy power was meant only
to create exceptional laws to be used in exigent circumstances, then
we may run into a problem of retroactivity. If the Bankruptcy Clause
was intended to give Congress the power to create laws that would
discharge existing indebtedness-as was the case with South Carolina's
colonial law129-then it would by definition have to have retroactive
effect. As discussed in Part IV.A below, it is one thing to legislate
bankruptcy relief prospectively; it is another to upset vested rights.
While this may be what the Framers intended, it creates significant
challenges to our treatment of state private law, especially property,
and especially as property may be protected in the Constitution.
2. Originalist Exceptionalism
Explaining why we have the Clause is not quite the same as
explaining what it means, or at least what it meant to the Framers. If,
as the conventional wisdom holds, the Framers intended the English
conception of bankruptcy, then they would presumably have constitu-
tionalized its limitations. As noted above, English bankruptcy was a
128 I recognize that the meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were
conducted in complete privacy. Max Farrand, Introduction to THE REcoRDs OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xi-xxv (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). Moreover,
all records of those meetings were sealed for more than thirty years after the Conven-
tion. See Res. 8, 15th Cong., 3 Stat. 475 (1818). According to Charles Warren, secrecy
was vital to making the constitution. CHIALES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 134-39 (1937).
129 See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
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limited form of relief, available to a narrow class of debtors, and only
under special circumstances-when it was in the interests of credi-
tors. 130 Nor was this understanding jettisoned during the fragile
period immediately after the Framing. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800131
was apparently "a faithful transcript of the English statutes.' 132
Yet, within twenty years, the Court had a different view. By 1819,
Chief Justice Marshall held in Sturges that Congress had broad discre-
tion to delimit the scope of the bankruptcy power, as he viewed the
distinction between "bankruptcy" laws and "insolvency" laws as largely
immaterial. 133 "Although the two systems"-bankruptcy and insol-
vency-"have existed apart from each other, there is such a connec-
tion between them as to render it difficult to say how far they may be
blended together. '"1 34 In deciding that, absent federal enactment of a
bankruptcy law, states could enact either, the ChiefJustice also gave to
Congress the power to decide broadly what sorts of laws would come
within the bankruptcy power. "The bankrupt law is said to grow out of
the exigencies of commerce," the Chief Justice explained, "and to be
applicable solely to traders; but it is not easy to say, who must be
excluded from, or may be included within, this description. It is, like
every other part of the subject, one on which the Legislature may
exercise an extensive discretion."1
35
This transformation presents another organic puzzle: are we
bound by the original, more limited, understanding today? "Original-
ism" has played an important role in constitutional methodology,
130 See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
131 Ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.
132 F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRuwcr LAw 124 (1919).
133 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819). As one author
explained:
The scope of a bankruptcy law, in the period in which the Constitution was
written, was to distribute the assets of a debtor among his creditors, and to
discharge him from the liability of having his future acquisitions attached at
the instance of his creditors for the unsatisfied portion of his debts. An
insolvency-law, on the other hand, operated upon the petition of the debtor
to liberate his person from prison in which he had been confined by the
process of State laws for the collection of debts.
NOEL, supra note 132, at 96.
134 Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 195.
135 Id. Relatively recent observers support this expansive interpretation. See Frank
R. Kennedy, Bankruptcy and the Constitution, in BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 131, 137-38
(ALI/ABI Comm'n on Continuing Prof I Educ. ed., 1988) ("When the variety of the
provisions enacted by Congress and the frequency and range of attacks on their con-
stitutionality are considered, it must be concluded that the courts have indeed come
close to permitting Congress complete freedom in formulating and enacting bank-
ruptcy legislation.").
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especially as its proclaimed adherents (most prominently Justice
Scalia t36) have been appointed to important courts. In its primitive
form, originalism's goal was to limit judges interpreting the Constitu-
tion to "establish [ing] the meaning of the Constitution[] in 1789."13 7
This should be done "by examining various evidence, including not
only, of course, the text of the Constitution and its overall structure,
but also the contemporaneous understanding" of the constitutional
provision in question.
1 38
Originalism has had many critics who note, among other things,
that it may be inconsistent with the Framers' own intentions, 39 would
subject us to the "'dead hand' of the past," 140 and would impair the
mechanism of stare decisis. Originalism has nevertheless "thrived like
no other approach to [constitutional] interpretation" 141 and, in the
process, become a more subtle and flexible tool. Today, for example,
we find Jack Balkin arguing, apparently seriously, that abortion is a
right that would be protected under the "original meaning' of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 142 Douglas Ginsburg and Randy Barnett,
among others, have argued that originalism would "restore" the Con-
stitution that was "lost" by the New Deal Court. 143 Debates today sur-
round whether originalism requires us to look to "original intent,"
"original meaning," or "original expected application" of the Consti-
tution's language.
If the Framers did intend to constitutionalize the English concep-
tion of bankruptcy, few scholars would suggest that Congress should
today be constrained by its limitations. Rather, most tend to agree
with Professor Kennedy, who observed that bankruptcy today reflects
136 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862-64
(1989) (discussing why originalism is superior to other forms of constitutional
interpretation).
137 Id. at 852.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 71, at 218-24; H.Jefferson Powell, The Original Under-
standing of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885, 902-21 (1985). But see Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 521 (2003) (offering
"some additional evidence for the proposition that originalism does not self-
destruct").
140 See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not As Radical
As It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 257 (2005) (discussing the challenges to
originalism).
141 Id.
142 Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning 102 (Yale Law Sch., Research
Paper No. 128, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=925558.
143 See RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 355 (2004); Doug-
las H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7, 16-17.
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a significant departure from the original understanding. 14 4 Some,
like Professor Plank, argue that bankruptcy as practiced today is in
fact consistent with the understanding the Framers would have had:
Unlike more controversial provisions of the Constitution (e.g., the
Commerce Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment) the Bankruptcy Clause has not undergone a dramatic
transformation from one interpretation to another. In my view...
all of the presumed "expansions" of Congress's bankruptcy acts
adjudicated by the Supreme Court fall well within the original
intent of the Bankruptcy Clause. Perhaps because they have
become accustomed to the extensive exercise [of] a federal power
limited only by the Bill of Rights, Congress ... and the courts are
not so much misinterpreting the Bankruptcy Clause as they are
ignoring it.
1 4 5
It is possible, of course, that the Framers had in mind a broader
understanding of the relief contemplated by the word "bankruptcies"
in 1787 than history would seem to indicate. It is possible that they in
fact anticipated a world in which bankruptcy law would be interpreted
broadly, in the way envisioned by Chief Justice Marshall roughly thirty
years later or our radically broader interpretation today, which makes
the discharge available on a voluntary basis to a wide range of debt-
ors. 146 It is possible, as discussed above, that they in fact intended
something resembling one of the many forms of colonial bankruptcy
or insolvency laws that came and went prior to ratification of the Con-
stitution. 147 But that seems unlikely. A more plausible story is that if
we take a strong form of originalism seriously, we have a problem,
because bankruptcy relief today goes beyond anything the Framers
likely meant or imagined. 148 In other words, we must make an excep-
tion for bankruptcy when it comes to the original meaning of the
Bankruptcy Clause.
144 Kennedy, supra note 135, at 137-38.
145 Plank, Limits, supra note 6, at 494 n.25.
146 The voluntary discharge was ultimately held by justice Catron to be within the
bankruptcy power. See In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 716, 718 (Catron, CircuitJustice, C.C.D.
Mo. 1843) (No. 7865).
147 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
148 It may be for this reason that Professor Plank has taken the exceptionalist posi-
tion that "the Bankruptcy Clause falls outside the debate over originalism and non-
originalism in constitutional interpretation." Plank, Limits, supra note 6, at 494-95
n.25. It is, of course, not clear why this should be so: if it is in the Constitution, and
we believe ourselves bound by the Framers' understandings, why should bankruptcy
be different? There is no ready evidence that they intended such exceptional treat-
ment for bankruptcy.
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3. Katz-Selective Originalism
Despite the fact that we appear to be unconstrained by the origi-
nal probable conception of the bankruptcy power, we nevertheless
find the Court using arguments about the framing era selectively in
aid of expanding the bankruptcy power. The most recent and promi-
nent example of this appears in Katz, where the Court held-by a 5-4
majority-that a state is not immune from a suit in a bankruptcy court
to avoid and recover a preferential transfer received by the state.
149
The Katz Court offered two basic grounds for its decision, both
rooted in an "original" understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause.
First, "[b] ankruptcyjurisdiction, as understood today and at the time
of the framing, is principally in remjurisdiction."1 50 This understand-
ing of bankruptcy was "as true in the 18th century as it is today. Then,
as now, the jurisdiction of courts adjudicating rights in the bankrupt
estate included the power to issue compulsory orders to facilitate the
administration and distribution of the res."'151 But this understanding
of bankruptcy was in fact broader than jurisdiction merely over things,
the Court said. When enacting the Bankruptcy Clause, "[t]he Fram-
ers would have understood that laws 'on the subject of Bankruptcies'
included laws providing, in certain limited respects, for more than
simple adjudications of rights in the res."'152 This included the "power
to issue ancillary orders" which effectively gave them the power to
"'pursue any legal method of recovering [the debtor's] property so
vested in them.
' 153
Second, the majority reasoned that the states must have con-
sented to jurisdiction to suit in federal bankruptcy courts by ratifica-
tion of the Constitution. 154 This consent derived from the concerns
and confusions discussed above emanating from wide disparities in
colonial and state laws on financial distress. According to the major-
ity, the "ineluctable conclusion"' 55 from these concerns about uni-
formity meant that the "States agreed in the plan of the Convention
not to assert any sovereign immunity defense they might have had in
proceedings brought pursuant to 'Laws on the subject of Bankrupt-
149 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373-78 (2006). The Eleventh
Amendment precludes suits "in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
150 Katz, 546 U.S. at 369.
151 Id. at 362.
152 Id. at 370 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
153 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *486).
154 See id. at 377.
155 Id.
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cies.'"15 6 The "scope of this consent" was, according to the majority,
"limited .. .[to] bankruptcy proceedings . . . in rem--a narrow juris-
diction that does not implicate state sovereignty to nearly the same
degree as other kinds ofjurisdiction."'
5 7
There has been no shortage of criticism of Katz. Martin Redish
and Daniel Greenfield characterize it as "unprincipled."'5  Professor
Plank says that "the [Katz] Court's historical and logical analysis is
manifestly deficient. ' 159 Ralph Brubaker notes that "[t]hose con-
cerned with the consistency and coherence of bankruptcy and consti-
tutional jurisprudence . . . will find no comfort in the Katz
decision." 6o1
The selective use of framing-era history in Katz indicates a third
form of organic exceptionalism: ordinarily, amendments to the Con-
stitution are viewed as constraints on earlier passages.1 6' Thus, the
Eleventh Amendment-whatever it may mean-would be understood
to constrain or condition that which preceded it, including provisions
of Article I. Yet, Katz tells us the opposite: the Bankruptcy Clause
implies the apparent power to defeat (take exception to) later amend-
ments to the Constitution.
III. STRUCTURAL PUZZLES; STRUCTURAL EXCEPTIONALISM
The preceding Part suggested that the bankruptcy power may
have been rooted in a kind of exceptionalism, and may thus challenge
originalist theory and conventional constructions of the Constitution.
A second class of constitutional puzzles involves bankruptcy's fit
within the structure of the Constitution.
Bankruptcy presents vertical and horizontal puzzles, and our
responses to both indicate exceptional treatment of constitutional
rules, standards, norms, and values in the presence of bankruptcy. In
the case of vertical relations, bankruptcy appears to be an exception
156 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
157 Id. at 378.
158 Martin H. Redish & Daniel M. Greenfield, Bankruptcy, Sovereign Immunity and
the Dilemma of Principled Decision Making: The Curious Case of Central Virginia Commu-
nity College v. Katz, 15 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 13, 48 (2007).
159 Thomas E. Plank, State Sovereignty in Bankruptcy After Katz, 15 Am. BANKR. INST.
L. REv. 59, 60 (2007).
160 Ralph Brubaker, Explaining Katz's New Bankruptcy Exception to State Sovereign
Immunity: The Bankruptcy Power as a Federal Forum Power, 15 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 95,
97 (2007).
161 See Redish & Greenfield, supra note 158, at 17 ("When interpretation of an
amendment is in play, differences between powers granted in the original document
in terms of text, history or Framers' intent are rendered irrelevant.").
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to the Rehnquist Court's robust protection for states from federal
judicial power. In the case of horizontal relations, bankruptcy appears
to be exceptional both in the mix of functions it locates in courts, and
in the relations it permits and requires between Article III and Article
I courts.
A. Vertical Relations
Katz is the latest in a series of bankruptcy decisions involving state
sovereign immunity which, in turn, form links in the much more com-
plex chain of adjustments to state-federal relations of the past ten
years or so. From the New Deal until the 1996 Seminole Tribe deci-
sion,162 the Court grew increasingly tolerant of Congressional
attempts to give private citizens the power to sue states in federal
court.16 3 In Seminole Tribe, however, the Supreme Court held that
Congress could not require states to submit to a federal court's order
for mediation under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),'
164
which was enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.1 65 The
Seminole Tribe majority reasoned that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment
restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be
used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction.1 6 6 Because the Seminole Tribe Court believed that "' [i] t is
162 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
163 See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
144 (1993); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S.
223, 227-29 & n.2 (1989); Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 472-74 (1987) (plurality opinion); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 237-38 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-100
(1984); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Employees of the Dep't of
Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973);
United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
U.S. 184, 186 (1964), overruled by Welch, 483 U.S. 468, and Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Pre-
paid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Ga. R.R. & Banking Co.
v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304 n.13 (1952); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323
U.S. 459, 464 (1945), overruled by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535
U.S. 613 (2002); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944). In a "sharp
break with the past," Seminole Tribe effectively overruled these cases. See Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164 Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2701-2721 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007)). Seminole Tribe specifically held the Act
unconstitutional. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76.
165 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 52; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving
Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... with the Indian tribes").
166 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
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inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent,"' 67 Seminole Tribe has been con-
strued to mean that "a federal statute supported by only an Article I
power cannot abrogate the state's sovereign immunity."' 68
Justice Stevens dissented in Seminole Tribe, arguing that its rule
would impair the application of federal laws, such as the Bankruptcy
Code, to the states. "The majority's opinion," he stated, "prevents
Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions
against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to
those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation
of our vast national economy." 169 Because, under the Supremacy
Clause, "federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising
under these federal laws," Justice Stevens reasoned that "the majority's
conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment shields States from being
sued under them in federal court suggests that persons harmed by
state violations of federal copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws
have no remedy."'
170
Seminole Tribe was not an aberration. In Alden v. Maine,'71 the
Court concluded that the common law nature of state sovereign
immunity protects states from federal claims in state courts as well as
federal courts. 172 State courts therefore should no longer be a forum
in which a debtor could seek to enforce a bankruptcy court order dis-
charging or subordinating a state claim. Nor could Congress use its
remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
defeat sovereign immunity. In City of Boerne v. Flores,173 the Court
restricted Congress' power under Section 5 and required Congress to
show that laws subjecting states to suit are congruent with, and pro-
portional to, the identified harm.174 This restrictive view of Section 5
foiled congressional attempts to abrogate state immunity from suit in
167 Id. at 54 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)).
168 Joanne C. Brant, The Ascent of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IowA L. REv. 767, 802
(1998).
169 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 77-78 n.1 (citing H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh
Amendment Jurisprudence After Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright,
and Other Causes of Action Over Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37
EMORY L.J. 645 (1988)).
171 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
172 Id. at 712 (holding the State of Maine immune from a Fair Labor Standards
Act claim in state court).
173 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
174 Id. at 519-20. Boerne held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000), was "so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
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connection with trademark, 75 patent,176 and age and disability dis-
crimination claims,1 77 among other things.
Yet, within five years, the Court appeared to backtrack-or at
least to recognize an exception for bankruptcy. In Tennessee Student
Assistance Cop. v. Hood,'78 the Court held that a state was not immune
from a proceeding in a bankruptcy court to establish the debtor's dis-
charge from her debt to the state. 179 ChiefJustice Rehnquist's major-
ity opinion focused not on the nature of the Bankruptcy Clause, 180
but instead on the nature of the proceeding under which the debtor's
debt was discharged. The Chief Justice reasoned that because bank-
ruptcy was an "in rem" proceeding,18 ' the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion was "premised on the res, not on the persona."18 2 Being an in
rem proceeding somehow altered the nature of the action com-
menced against the state. Although denominated an "adversary pro-
ceeding" 1 8 3 -and in almost every material respect identical to a civil
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a sub-
stantive change in constitutional protections." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
175 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 675 (1999).
176 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 637-38 (1999).
177 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding
states immune from Americans with Disabilities Act claims); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-81 (2000) (holding states immune from Age Discrimination
Employment Act claims).
178 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
179 Id. at 443. So as not to overstate the claim that bankruptcy was entirely excep-
tional here, Hood was preceded by the Court's decision one year earlier in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), which held that state
employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the state's
failure to comply with the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993. See id. at 727-28. Hibbs may be distinguishable from Hood, however, in that
it was decided under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the " 'congruence
and proportionality'" standard developed thereunder in Boerne. Id. at 728 (quoting
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520).
180 Curiously, the ChiefJustice's opinion does start by quoting it. Hood, 541 U.S.
at 443 ("Article I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have the
power '[t]o establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States.'").
181 Id. at 447.
182 Id. at 450.
183 Id. at 451. The discharge sought in Hood required commencement of an
"adversary proceeding," governed by Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Pro-
cedure, which incorporates many but not all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001-7087. An adversary proceeding requires, among other things,
the service of a summons and a complaint. See id. 7001(6), 7003, 7004.
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complaint-the action was nevertheless "part of the original bank-
ruptcy case and still within the bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdic-
tion. 18 4 Not being a suit, the state was, a fortiori, subject to the
discharge complaint.
Few constitutional problems are as vexing as those posed by state
sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. As is well known,
the Eleventh Amendment was a response to Chisholm v. Georgia,1
85
where the Supreme Court held that states could be subject to suit in
United States district courts to collect debts incurred to finance the
Revolution.18 6 Over the years, four general theories have emerged to
explain immunity and the Eleventh Amendment.
1. Abrogation. The first, and most nearly textual vision of the
Eleventh Amendment, is that of abrogationists. According to Redish
and Greenfield, this position reflects the view that "the Eleventh
Amendment was intended to cabin the authority of the federal judiciary
to abrogate state sovereign immunity, but not deprive Congress of that
authority."
' 18 7
2. Diversity. The "diversity" theory holds that the Eleventh
Amendment bars only suits against a state when jurisdiction is
grounded solely on the diversity of the parties-i.e., a state cannot be
sued in a federal court by a citizen of another state. This view was
introduced by Justice Brennan's dissent in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon. 1
88
184 Hood, 541 U.S. at 452 (citation omitted).
185 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
186 In Chisholm, the Court held that a citizen of South Carolina could bring an
assumpsit action in federal court against the State of Georgia. Id. at 480. The Court
rejected Georgia's contention that its sovereign nature protected it from being sued
in federal court and that the provision of Article III extending jurisdiction to contro-
versies "between a State and Citizens of another State," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1,
applied only when the state was the plaintiff in the action. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) at 469 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
187 Redish & Greenfield, supra note 158, at 23 (citing John E. Nowak, The Scope of
Congressional Power To Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of
the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413 (1975)); see also Lau-
rence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Sep-
aration of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. Rev. 682, 684
(1976) ("Eleventh [A]mendment jurisprudence has left no doubt that the amend-
ment not only reversed Chisholm, but also countermanded any judicial inclination to
interpret article III as a self-executing abrogation of state immunity from suit ..
(footnote omitted)).
188 473 U.S. 234, 258-90 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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3. The "Plan-of-the-Convention." The "Plan-of-the-Convention"
theory was propounded in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.' 89 This is
"premised on the concept 'that the States enjoy no immunity where
there has been a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the [consti-
tutional] convention.' "' 90 Its principal expression has been Katz.191
4. Common law. Under cases like Hans v. LouisianaI92 and
Alden, immunity from suit is not a function of the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. Rather, it is inherent in the nature of statehood, which
neither the plan of the Convention nor Congress could alter-a form
of constitutional "common law.
193
The Eleventh Amendment has something to make just about eve-
rybody unhappy. It challenges any textualist approach to the Consti-
tution, since the Court has for many years given it a meaning vastly
different from the common understanding of its language.' 94 For
originalists who may feel themselves drawn to text, it is difficult to
imagine that the Framers of the amendment in fact intended some-
thing different from the Amendment's "unusually precise" provi-
sions.1 95 For those who view the Constitution as laying atop a
foundation of "natural" or "common" law of which sovereign immu-
nity is a core feature, the history that preceded and followed the
Amendment suggests that, so far as the Framers were concerned,
states had no such immunity. 196 For those who view the Constitution
189 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
190 Redish & Greenfield, supra note 158, at 23 (alteration in original) (quoting
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20 (plurality opinion)).
191 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373-78 (2006).
192 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
193 See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV.
551, 553 n.6 (2006) (characterizing Hans as an application of common law principles
to constitutional law interpretation).
194 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1342, 1345 (1989) ("[I]t is... difficult to think of any other facet of the
Constitution with respect to which the Court has reached results so obviously inconsis-
tent with the words used by the framers.").
195 See id. at 1346.
196 While the Eleventh Amendment may have overruled Chisolm, that case was not
an aberration. Even after the decision, but before ratification of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court continued to treat states as ordinary defendants, issuing
process against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the unreported case of Vassall
v. Massachusetts on behalf of a loyalist seeking to recover property confiscated by the
state. See Marshall, supra note 194, at 1357 & n.62. After ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court continued to hold that states could be subject to federal court
review. In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the Court held that the
Commonwealth of Virginia was not immune from a "writ of error." Id. at 407. The
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as a "living document," designed to change with the times, subject to
principles of stare decisis, the Amendment is a study in schizophrenia;
interpreted first narrowly as written, 97 then ignored in Hans, then
contracted throughout the New Deal, 198 then dilated in Seminole
Tribe.199 The Eleventh Amendment may be a product of political com-
promise,200 but what guidance does a spirit of compromise give courts
trying to decide whether states may, or may not, be hauled into a fed-
eral bankruptcy court? Yet, this is what Katz and Hood tell us can
happen.
The fact is that Katz is problematic. Evidence that the Framers
wanted to create a congressional power to preempt inconsistent state
laws is not evidence that Congress wanted to empower individuals to
drag states into federal courts. Moreover, it suggests that later amend-
ments to the Constitution do not constrain the bankruptcy power. It
is unlikely Congress will take Katz and run too far with that sugges-
tion. But, as argued in Part II.B.3 above, a reasonable inference
would be that Katz could form the basis for a bankruptcy power
unchecked by the First, Fifth, or any other Amendments. 20'
While Katz's analysis leaves something to be desired, there is
much to be said for the result. It is hard to find a compelling basis in
constitutional text or policy for exempting states from bankruptcy
court process, especially as Congress has been fairly solicitous of
states' economic interests by providing special treatment for many
state tax and similar claims. 20 2 From a textual standpoint, it seems
unlikely that the Eleventh Amendment has much to do with bank-
ruptcy. The Eleventh Amendment applies by its terms only to the
'judicial power." Thus, if one is an abrogationist, one might say Con-
state was not immune, in part, because the writ was not a "suit" within the language of
the Eleventh Amendment, but instead "a commission by which the judges of one
Court are authorized to examine a record upon which a judgment was given in
another Court." Id. at 409.
197 See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 412 (holding that a "writ of error" was not a
"suit" and therefore a state was not immune).
198 See, e.g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933).
199 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
200 See Marshall, supra note 194, at 1353.
201 A recent case note in the Harvard Law Review observes that Katz's weaknesses
include its failure to fully flesh out the limits of its in rem analysis and to back up its
suppositions about original intent. See Case Comment, State Sovereign Immunity-
Bankruptcy, 120 HARv. L. REv. 125, 131-32 (2006).
202 See Lipson, Fighting Fiction, supra note 6, at 1275 ("The new federalism should
tolerate the subordination and discharge of state claims because Congress carefully
tailored the Bankruptcy Code to reflect the needs of the states by giving priority to,
and exempting from discharge, a variety of state tax claims.").
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gress-which exercises legislative, not judicial, power-can do any-
thing it likes to states under the bankruptcy power. Whether it does
so through a court is incidental. Moreover, the concerns that gave
rise to the Eleventh Amendment-serious challenges to fragile state
fiscs-have little in common with the problems presented by subject-
ing states to bankruptcy court power today. Massive public financial
failure was a credible-albeit possibly exaggerated-concern in the
wake of Chisholm.20 3 Today, it is unlikely states will become insolvent
by virtue of Katz.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the result in Katz, the fact is
that it strongly smacks of exceptionalism. According to Professor
Plank, "[C] ourts most likely will view Katz as creating a special excep-
tion to the States' general sovereign immunity when Congress acts
pursuant to its power to 'establish... uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.' " 204 Although the Rehn-
quist Court also deferred in sometimes surprising ways in respect of
other Article I powers, 20 5 it did not do so with the depth or force seen
in Katz. While principles of sovereign immunity may limit Congress'
other Article I powers to create federal jurisdiction over states, bank-
ruptcy would appear to be an exception.
B. Horizontal Relations
The prior subpart demonstrated that the constitutional trend in
states' rights seems to have reached its limit-or found an excep-
tion-in bankruptcy. Horizontal-meaning interbranch-relations
are perhaps even more perplexing than those involving the states.
Here, too, bankruptcy appears to generate exceptional constitutional
rules, standards, norms, and values. Unlike virtually every other devel-
oped congressional power under Article I, the bankruptcy power is
conducted almost entirely in courts.206 The principal horizontal prob-
203 See Michael S. Schreiber, Original Intent and the Bankruptcy Power: What Were
They Thinking?, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 165, 166 (2003) (indicating that the states
had borrowed approximately $200 million to finance the War of Independence).
204 Plank, supra note 159, at 59-60 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
205 The principal example here will be Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003),
where the Supreme Court upheld the Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No.
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), as permitted by the Intellectual Property Clause.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198.
206 Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy:Judicial Lawmaking
in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 84 (2006) ("Bankruptcy is the only major
statutory system in the United States without a federal agency responsible for its
implementation. Instead, in bankruptcy, the courts play the role that agencies fill in
other areas of law.").
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lem has been that the status and jurisdiction of these bankruptcy
courts is far from clear.
Strictly speaking, bankruptcy jurisdiction is lodged in United
States district courts, which have "original and exclusive jurisdiction" of
"cases" arising under the Bankruptcy Code.20 7 As a practical matter,
however, all of the important business in bankruptcy is conducted
through "proceedings," which are the constituent parts of the
"case."20 8 When it comes to these "proceedings," the district courts
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction: to a greater or lesser
extent, this jurisdiction over proceedings in bankruptcy cases can
be-and as a practical matter almost always is2 9-"referred" to bank-
ruptcy courts. 210 District courts, then, usually sit in an appellate
capacity with respect to most, but not all, bankruptcy matters. 2
11
At least as a conceptual matter, bankruptcy jurisdiction is exceed-
ingly-perhaps needlessly-complex and uncertain. As Professor
Brubaker has noted, "[T] he jurisdiction in bankruptcy remains one of
the most enduring puzzles of our federal court system."212 The puzzle
is due in part to the uncertain location of the bankruptcy courts on
207 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
208 See CHARLESJORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUTCY § 11.6, at 778-79 (1997);
see also id. § 4.1, at 217 ("[B]ankruptcy case[s] [are] composed of many different
types of matters and 'proceedings.' These proceedings range in complexity from
uncontested administrative tasks to full-scale adversarial litigation. Traditional civil
lawsuits of the 'A versus B' variety comprise only a small portion of a typical bank-
ruptcy case.").
209 See Darrell Dunham, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 67 UMKC L. REv. 229, 281
(1998).
210 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000).
211 As is familiar to bankruptcy practitioners, bankruptcy judges may "hear and
determine" "core" matters, the first of which is, interestingly, not a traditional matter
of adjudication, but instead the "administration of the estate." Id. § 157(b) (2) (A).
Final orders issued by a bankruptcy court involving core matters are reviewed on an
appellate basis by the district court. The bankruptcy judge may not, however, "deter-
mine" or enter final orders regarding "non-core" proceedings that are "related to" the
bankruptcy case. See id. § 157 (c) (1). As to these matters, the bankruptcy court may
make proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the district court shall
review not in an appellate capacity, but de novo. Id. Much of the controversy about
bankruptcy jurisdiction surrounds the reach of this "related to" jurisdiction. See gener-
ally Brubaker, supra note 6, at 751 ("[T]his Article proffers a comprehensive, unifying
statutory and constitutional theory that would vastly simplify and bring principled lim-
its to third-party 'related to' bankruptcy jurisdiction.").
212 Brubaker, supra note 6, at 746. "[B]ankruptcy," he continues, "has become the
seemingly inscrutable crucible of federal jurisdiction theory. In fact, because it is not
easily explained by traditional theory, most scholars rely upon bankruptcy to buttress
novel and unconventional departures that would accommodate the apparent anomaly
of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction." Id. at 747.
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the horizontal axis in the constitutional structure. On the one hand,
bankruptcy judges are clearly not Article III judges.213 They are not
appointed for life by the President or protected against salary diminu-
tion, as would be the case with Article IIIjudges.214 Instead, they are
appointed by the United States courts of appeals, with terms of four-
teen years.215 On the other hand, while they are Article I judges, 21
6
they are statutorily characterized as 'judicial officer[s] of the district
court," and the bankruptcy courts are "units" of the district courts.
217
The duality of bankruptcy jurisdiction partially reflects deeper
problems with the separation of Article I and Article III powers, a sub-
ject with its own considerable uncertainties. The literature suggests at
least three different approaches to this broader question. First, the
Court may set forth categorical constraints on what goes in the Article
I bucket, and what goes in the Article III bucket. The most recent-
and controversial-example of this is, as discussed below, Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,2 18 which struck down
the initial grant ofjurisdiction under the current Bankruptcy Code.219
Second, the Court may engage in some form of balancing test, as it
did implicitly in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,
2 2 0
213 Article III provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
214 Article II provides:
He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
215 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1) (2000).
216 Article I gives Congress the power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
217 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
218 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
219 Id. at 87.
220 473 U.S. 568, 586-89 (1985).
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and explicitly in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.2 21
Third, a number of academics have argued that the dispositive issue
should be the presence of appellate review by an Article III court of
non-Article III judicial actions.
222
While there are many explanations for the complexity and uncer-
tainty of the current distribution of bankruptcy powers, the current
system-and its puzzles-are the product of at least two basic trends
which have combined to render bankruptcy jurisdiction constitution-
ally exceptional in a variety of ways. This subpart explains these
trends, the first of which involves developing understandings of the
distinction between public and private rights, and the second of which
involves the treatment of bankruptcy as a judicial rather than an
administrative problem.
1. Public-Private Trend
The first trend affecting bankruptcy jurisdiction involves a trans-
formation in the way we understand bankruptcy as a function of pub-
lic versus private rights. Historically, financial distress was considered
a public problem, which required public responses. The earliest
forms of response were quintessentially public: incarceration in debt-
ors' prison or worse. 22 3 Relief from debt was also quintessentially pub-
lic. One of the earliest versions of the discharge was a declaration
from Caesar available beginning around 46 B.C.E., known as the cessio
bonorum, whereby debts would be forgiven under certain circum-
stances-a public form of debt jubilee. 224 Colonial and state legisla-
tures through the nineteenth century frequently enacted so-called
221 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
222 The leading citation here is usually Fallon, supra note 38, at 933 ("The core
claim of this theory is that sufficiently searching review of a legislative court's or
administrative agency's decisions by a constitutional court will always satisfy the
requirements of article III."); see also Pfander, supra note 38, at 647 n.10 (collecting
authorities); see also id. at 666-71 (criticizing appellate review theory). Among other
things, the appellate review theory is "embarrassed" by the fact that it would conflict
with the Constitution's literal limitations on Congress' power to create inferior courts
or tribunals (which does not expressly include an appellate review element). Id. at
667-68.
223 Blackstone, among others, indicates that prior to English law, which itself pro-
vided the death penalty for debt defaults, insolvency could be punished by imprison-
ment or slavery of the debtor, or the sale and enslavement of the debtor's family. See
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *473.
224 See Theodore C. Albert, The Insolvency Law of Ancient Rome, 28 CAL. BANKR. J.
365, 383 & n.102 (2006).
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"private" bankruptcy bills-individualized grants of bankruptcy
relief.2
25
We have moved from these more overtly public responses to
financial distress to ones that are now significantly-but not exclu-
sively-private. A major change in this regard occurred in the middle
of the nineteenth century, with the advent of the federal equity receiv-
ership, a proceeding in many respects analogous to the Chapter 11
reorganization. 226 In federal equity receiverships, federal district
judges presided over the consensual-that is, contractual-restructur-
ing of the debtor's financial relationships. 227 Today, there are increas-
ing calls to make contract-a largely private institution-the response
of first resort to any question of financial distress. 228 Indeed, this is at
the heart of the creditors' bargain, discussed in Part L.A above.
Making a hard distinction between public and private is some-
what artificial, especially in bankruptcy. Yet, it was central to the
Supreme Court's conclusion that the original grant of bankruptcy
jurisdiction under the current Bankruptcy Code was unconstitutional
in Northern Pipeline.229 Factually, Northern Pipeline could not have been
a simpler case. Northern Pipeline was a Chapter 11 debtor with a
state private law breach of contract claim against Marathon Pipe
Line.230 Marathon moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978 gave bankruptcy judges Article III powers, without
giving them Article III protections, in particular against firing (life
225 See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 28, at 14 (describing "ad hoc" legislation provid-
ing relief to "named insolvents").
226 These reorganizations were, until 1933, governed largely by contract, and not
by the Bankruptcy Code or anything resembling it. In 1933, Congress enacted section
77 of the Bankruptcy Act in order to address the "sudden evaporation of railroad
earning power" that "was plunging thousands of miles of lines into insolvency." Act of
Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474-82, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)); see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRuprcy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 263 (1973)
[hereinafter 1973 COMMISSION REPORT] ("[S]ection 77 was originally added to the
Bankruptcy Act in 1933 and completely rewritten in 1935 for purposes of rearrange-
ment, simplification, and clarification." (footnotes omitted)). A useful recent discus-
sion of the realities of the railroad reorganizations appears in Stephen J. Lubben,
Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1453-68
(2004).
227 See Lubben, supra note 226, at 1441-46.
228 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107
YALE L.J. 1807, 1819-33 (1998).
229 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71-72 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
230 Id. at 56.
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tenure) and salary diminution.2 3 I Although the bankruptcy court
denied the motion, the district court reversed on appeal. 232 The
Supreme Court upheld the district court.
2 33
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan (joined byJus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens), rested on a fairly rigid separa-
tion of powers analysis. The 1978 Act gave bankruptcy courts
jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising
in or related to cases under title 11. "234 This was problematic because,
according to the plurality, it vested the 'judicial power" in bankruptcy
judges who did not have Article III status (life tenure and protection
against salary diminution).235 The bankruptcy courts created in the
1978 Act could be tolerated only if they fit within one of three "nar-
row,"2 3 6 categorical exceptions to Article III adjudication: (1) they
were "territorial" courts, (2) they involved "courts martial," or (3) they
involved the adjudication of "public rights."23 7 Since bankruptcy
involved neither of the first two, the important question was whether
bankruptcy jurisdiction involved "public rights" or "private rights."
2 38
The plurality apparently concluded that the debtor's breach of
contract claim was a "private" right that could not be adjudicated by a
bankruptcy court:
The distinction between public rights and private rights has not
been definitively explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to
do so in the present cases, for it suffices to observe that a matter of
public rights must at a minimum arise "between the government
and others." In contrast, "the liability of one individual to another
under the law as defined," is a matter of private rights. Our prece-
dents clearly establish that only controversies in the former category
may be removed from Art. III courts and delegated to legislative
courts or administrative agencies for their determination. Private-
rights disputes, on the other hand, lie at the core of the historically
recognized judicial power.
2 39
The debtor's breach of contract claim in Northern Pipeline was
"clearly ... subject to Art[icle] III" because it was a "private adjudica-
231 See id. at 56-57.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 88.
234 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 241 (a),
§ 1471(b)-(c), 92 Stat. 2549, 2668.
235 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86 (plurality opinion).
236 Id. at 64.
237 See id. at 64-70.
238 See id. at 67-70.
239 Id. at 69-70 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
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tion[,] . . . [a] matter[ ] from [its] nature subject to 'a suit at [the]
common law or in equity or admiralty.' ",240 The United States was not
a "proper party" to that dispute. 241 This placed it outside "the core of
the federal bankruptcy power"-"the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations." 242 Because private adjudications were at the heart of Arti-
cle III judging, and bankruptcy judges lacked Article III status, the
bankruptcy court could not decide Northern Pipeline's breach of con-
tract claim against Marathon. Nor could the Bankruptcy Clause over-
come this. The appellants had argued that cases such as Palmore v.
United States243 gave Congress the power to limit Article IIIjurisdiction
in "'specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting dis-
tinctive treatment.' ' '2 44 Bankruptcy should be one of these, they
argued, as evidenced by the Bankruptcy Clause. Justice Brennan
rejected this because, he argued, "it provides no limiting principle.
245
Evidence that bankruptcy jurisdiction is constitutionally excep-
tional derives from the fact that the Court soon abandoned Northern
Pipeline's approach to the public-private rights analysis, first in Union
Carbide and then in Schor. In Union Carbide, the Court permitted Con-
gress to require binding arbitration of claims filed under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 2 46 with limited Article III
judicial review.247  "Public rights," according to the Union Carbide
Court are not, contra Northern Pipeline, limited to those "'arising
between the Government and persons subject to its authority.'
248
Rather, they involve rights arising under federal statutes that do not
"depend on or replace a right . . . under state law."'249 Union Carbide
read Northern Pipeline to mean that Congress could not "vest in a
non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment,
240 Id. at 70-71 n.25 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)).
241 See id. at 69-70 n.23 ("[T]he presence of the United States as a proper party to
the proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing 'private
rights' from 'public rights."').
242 Id. at 71.
243 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
244 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 72 (plurality opinion) (quoting Palmore, 411 U.S. at
408).
245 Id. at 73.
246 Ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C.).
247 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582-84 (1985).
248 Id. at 585 (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-68 (plurality opinion)).
249 Id. at 584.
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and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under
state law, without consent of the litigants.
2 50
In Schor, Justice O'Connor observed that "there is no reason
inherent in separation of powers principles to accord the state law
character of a [private rights] claim talismanic power in Article III
inquiries.125 1 Like Union Carbide, and contra the teaching of Northern
Pipeline, Schor involved a dispute not between the government and an
individual, but instead between two private parties-a disgruntled
stock customer suing his broker under the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission Act.2 52 Initially, the plaintiffs case was heard by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which by regu-
lation permitted the broker-defendant to assert counterclaims arising
out of the same transaction or occurrence against the customer.
253
When the CFTC decided the counterclaims in the defendant's favor,
the plaintiff claimed the administrative body lacked jurisdiction over
the counterclaim.
2 54
In concluding that this non-Article III entity had jurisdiction to
resolve this dispute between two private parties, Justice O'Connor dis-
tinguished Northern Pipeline on the grounds that the bankruptcy juris-
diction at issue in that case was much broader than that of the
CFTC.255 Moreover, although the CFTC could resolve the dispute,
the victor would still have to go to a district court to enforce whatever
decree the agency issued. 256 As Carl Pickerill has observed, "While
Schor did not overrule Northern Pipeline explicitly, one must wonder
whether Northern Pipeline still has staying power" as a guide to the pub-
lic-private distinction in federal jurisdiction. 257 In other words, North-
250 Id. (citing N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84 (plurality opinion); id. at 90-92 (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring); id. at 92 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)).
251 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986).
252 Id. at 837.
253 Id.
254 See id. at 838.
255 See id. at 852-53 (characterizing bankruptcy jurisdiction as unconstitutional
because it includes "'all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related
to cases under title 11"' (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982))).
256 Id. at 853.
257 Carl N. Pickerill, Note, Specialized Adjudication in an Administrative Forum: Bridg-
ing the Gap Between Public and Private Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1605, 1642 (2007)
(footnote omitted) ("Schor seems to permit non-Article III courts to exercise jurisdic-
tion over cases normally heard by either federal or state court judges, as long as the
case is not terribly important and the judicial power is not terribly infringed. Northern
Pipeline, however, seemed to deny that same exercise ofjurisdiction to the Bankruptcy
court." (footnote omitted)). Indeed, it would appear that even Justice Brennan, who
authored the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline, soon came to a different view. See
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989) ("The crucial question, in
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ern Pipeline may reflect a theory of the public-private distinction
applicable to only one form of federal jurisdiction-bankruptcy.
258
2. The Adjudication of Bankruptcy
Northern Pipeline instantly presented a crisis for Congress, which
returned to the drawing board in order to produce a jurisdictional
scheme that would survive constitutional challenge. That scheme is
the current version of the Bankruptcy Code, whose jurisdictional pro-
visions were enacted in 1984, and are summarized above.
2 59
The jurisdiction that Congress originally conferred on bank-
ruptcy courts-and that Northern Pipeline struck-was probably the
high point in a second long-term trend in the development of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, a trend towards treating it as a matter of judicial,
rather than administrative, concern. In England before the Framing,
according to Blackstone, bankruptcy involved an "extrajudicial
method of proceeding" before commissioners who lacked life tenure
and who oversaw the administrative and judicial management of debt-
ors' estates. 260 The administrative nature of bankruptcy was repli-
cated in early bankruptcy legislation in the United States, which
tended to lodge both administrative and judicial functions in a single,
non-Article III "commissioner."
261
cases not involving the Federal Government, is whether 'Congress, acting for a valid
legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, [has] cre-
ate[d] a seemingly private right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement
by the Article III judiciary.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Union Carbide, 473 U.S.
at 593-94)).
258 Northern Pipeline may also be exceptional in the sense that it was really a
response by the Court to a specific concern about congressional encroachment on
the judicial power. Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that the decision was a reaction to
a unique historical time, when Congress was increasingly trying to tread on the judici-
ary. See Chemerinsky, Courts, supra note 38, at 123. Northern Pipeline may have been
exceptional because it was intended to send a message to Congress about the limits of
its structural power vis-A-vis the federal judiciary. This would tend to undercut the
view that exceptionalism is driven by financial distress. But, it suggests that bank-
ruptcy may be sufficiently different that it is permissible to use it as a vehicle to send
such a message.
259 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 28 U.S.C.); supra
notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
260 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *477.
261 Both the United States Bankruptcy Act of 1800 and Pennsylvania's Bankruptcy
Act of 1785 created "commissioners" who performed both judicial and administrative
functions, the latter including the collection and administration of the debtor's estate
pending distribution to creditors. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 2, 2 Stat. 19,
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This began to change, however, with the Bankruptcy Act of 1841,
which gave United States district courts 'Jurisdiction in all matters and
proceedings in bankruptcy arising under [the 1841] act. '262 In Ex
parte Christy,2 63 Justice Story concluded that this created a very broad
bankruptcy jurisdiction, over "all matters and proceedings in bank-
ruptcy arising under" the 1841 Act.2 64 While this jurisdiction was not
lodged in bankruptcy judges, as such, it was vested in the judiciary,
rather than in "commissioners" or assignees, as had previously been
the case. 26
5
The complicated history that followed contains much nuance,
but can be seen as a dialectic between vesting bankruptcy powers in
Article III judges as against relegating this work to nonjudicial actors.
When today's Bankruptcy Code was being developed in the 1970s, a
number of observers-in particular, bankruptcy referees and profes-
sionals-argued that Congress should create bankruptcy judgeships
with Article III status. 2 66 This effort failed, due largely to the interces-
sion of Chief Justice Burger and resistance from other federal judges,
who viewed bankruptcy judges as "inferior."2 67 As Bankruptcy Judge
Mund recently explained:
21-22 (repealed 1803); Act for the Regulation of Bankruptcy, ch. 1183, § 2 (1785),
reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 To 1801, at 70, 71
(1906); see also John C. McCoid, 1I, Right to Jury Trial in Bankruptcy: Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 65 Am. BANKR. L.J. 15, 30 (1991) (noting that while bankruptcy
commissioners "clearly functioned in a judicial fashion" at least some of their work
"more nearly resembled the activities of our present-day administrative agencies").
262 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 440, 445 (repealed 1843).
263 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292 (1845).
264 Id. at 313. Christy involved an assignee's suit to recover real estate seized from
the debtor in mortgage foreclosure proceedings in state court prior to commence-
ment of the bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 298. The assignee challenged the validity
of the underlying mortgages. See id. at 293-97, 308-11.
265 See Brubaker, supra note 6, at 759 ("After a nearly forty-year hiatus in federal
bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 . . . brought the first explicit statutory
grant of a general federal jurisdiction over all 'bankruptcy proceedings.'").
266 See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION 157-58 (2001).
267 See id. at 158 ("ChiefJustice Burger shared the districtjudges' concerns about
diluting the federal bench and about the inferior quality of many bankruptcy
judges."). Judge Mund quotes the following letter from Justice Burger to President
Carter:
To put it bluntly, [giving bankruptcy judges Article III status] stems from the
desire of those officers who were initially appointed to office as bankruptcy
referees and who serve as adjunct aides to DistrictJudges to achieve a higher
status, with virtually all but the status of "life tenure" judges-almost like
promoting all the Army's Sergeants Major to Captain rank!
Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978-Part One: Outside Looking In, 81 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (quot-
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There was a certain stigma attached to bankruptcy practice and
practitioners. The district court appointed referees-in-bankruptcy,
who were paid a portion of the assets that passed through their
administration. The referees dealt with the mundane business
affairs of the cases, even signing the disbursement checks. They
handled neither the significant constitutional issues nor the high
profile civil and criminal ones that drew politically well-connected
attorneys to the Article III bench.
268
Yet, the fact is that the bankruptcy referees and professionals
were able to strike a terrific political coup in capturing the jurisdiction
and status they did obtain under the 1978 Act. The result of their
efforts, among other things, "increased the profile and potential
power of bankruptcy judges to such an extent that the Article IIIjudi-
ciary could no longer ignore the implications of the proposed
changes. This led to almost instant backlash and an internecine fight
within the judicial branch." 269 Northern Pipeline was the knockout
round in that fight.
The current distribution of bankruptcy jurisdiction reflects a
series of political decisions to make bankruptcy a matter of adjudica-
tion rather than agency administration. Yet, part of what makes bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction so complex is the fact that bankruptcy judges are,
for all practical purposes, both adjudicators and administrators in
ways that may be unique in our federal system.27 0 When they hear
and determine "core" disputes-characterized as either "adversary
proceedings" or "contested matters"-they are clearly exercising a
judicial function. 271 Yet, much of the work of bankruptcy courts is
administrative, or at least so different in kind from the work of Article
ing Letter from Chief Justice Warren Burger to President Jimmy Carter (Oct. 27,
1978)).
268 Mund, supra note 267, at 3.
269 Id. at 30.
270 See TABB, supra note 208, § 4.1, at 217 (characterizing bankruptcy jurisdiction
as "unique"). As Professor Brubaker has observed in a slightly different context:
A bankruptcy "case," though, is not the equivalent of an ordinary civil "case."
Bankruptcy contains a unique admixture of ordinary adversarial litigation,
contested administrative hearings, and judicial oversight of an administrative
process-some of which contains litigable controversies and some of which
does not. An attempt to find a uniform theory that explains all of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction as one constitutional "case," then, seems predestined to
fall short ....
Brubaker, supra note 6, at 806. The largely administrative character of most bank-
ruptcies was emphasized by the comprehensive Brookings Institute study of DA\'ID T.
STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRuP-rcY 147-72 (1971).
271 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001-7087 (adversary proceedings); id. 9014 (contested
matters).
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III district court judges as to be unrecognizable as adjudication.
Indeed, an entire chapter of the Bankruptcy Code-Chapter 3-is
devoted to "case administration. '" 272 Among other things, bankruptcy
judges (1) accept the filing of bankruptcy petitions; 273 (2) remove
bankruptcy trustees;274 (3) approve the retention of professionals in
the case;2 7 5 (4) review and approve applications for the payment of
professionals' fees; 2 7 6 (5) review and approve requests for the debtor
to engage in nonordinary-course transactions, including undertaking
financing and selling assets; 277 (6) manage the filing, and allowance
or disallowance, of claims and administrative expenses;278 (7) appoint
trustees or examiners; 279 (8) review and approve disclosure state-
ments; 280 (9) review and confirm plans of reorganization; 28 1 and (10)
review, approve, and enter discharge orders. 28 2
While many of these and other administrative matters could
become disputed, and thus require a neutral judicial resolution, most
do not. Yet, bankruptcy judges do these things regardless of the pres-
ence of adversity. In short, they play an important-but obviously
not exclusive-role in managing bankruptcy cases in ways that
district courts do not "manage" the cases and controversies that
come before them.28 3 This is doubtless one reason district courts
272 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-366 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
273 See id. § 301 (West Supp. 2007); see also 1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
226, at 121 ("[V]oluntary petitions do not pose any issues requiring judicial
resolution ....").
274 See 11 U.S.C. § 324 (2000).
275 See id. § 327.
276 See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 328, 330 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
277 See id. §§ 363-364.
278 See id. §§ 501, 502-503, 1111(a).
279 See id. § 1104.
280 See id. § 1125.
281 See id. § 1129.
282 See id. §§ 524, 1141(c).
283 Professor Pfander sends conflicting signals on how he views the nature of bank-
ruptcy courts. On the one hand, he acknowledges that "bankruptcy operates as a
mixed system. The bankruptcy courts act in part as Article I tribunals, handling mat-
ters within the traditional power of commissioners and referees, and being subject to
eventual review in Article III courts." Pfander, supra note 38, at 770. On the other
hand, he suggests that they should perhaps become Article III courts because they are
just judging:
As currently structured, the bankruptcy courts no longer perform any
administrative function but act solely as neutral and independent tribunals
for the resolution of disputes. Without any administrative role, the case for
bankruptcy courts outside of Article III grows more difficult to sustain. One
can fairly ask why Article III does not require Congress either to grant the
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do not want to do bankruptcy work unless they absolutely have to
take it.
2 84
There is nothing exceptional about congressional powers that
create both administrative and judicial work. Federal laws on taxa-
tion, intellectual property, and immigration, among others, do both.
But unlike bankruptcy, these and other developed Article I powers are
conducted through two distinct sets of mechanisms, agencies and
courts. Income tax returns are not filed with the tax court, but the
Internal Revenue Service. 285 Patent applications and copyright regis-
trations are not, in the first instance, submitted to federal courts for
recognition, but instead to the Patent and Trademark Office or Copy-
right Register, respectively. 286 Immigration decisions are made in the
first instance by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (formerly
known as the Immigration and Naturalization Service), and are then
(usually) subject to judicial review.
287
To be sure, bankruptcy has an administrative apparatus, the
Office of the United States Trustee (UST).288 But its work is far more
bankruptcy courts formal Article III status or to transfer the work back onto
the dockets of the district courts.
Id.
284 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 4, 49, 50-51,107-08,111(1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5965-66, 6010-11, 6011-12, 6068-69, 6072-73; 1973 COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 226, at 5-6, 81, 85-86, 94, 112, 120-21, 126.
285 See 26 U.S.C §§ 6301-6302 (2000).
286 See, e.g., Tiseo Architects, Inc. v. SSOE, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 735, 740 (E.D.
Mich. 2006) ("[T]he Court appears to lack jurisdiction to cancel Plaintiff's copyright
registration, which would be required were the Court to rule as Defendant suggests.
The Register of Copyrights is vested with the authority to set regulations consistent
with the Copyright statutes." (citing 17 U.S.C. § 702 (2000))).
287 See 8 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 104.01
(2005).
288 The duties of the UST are set forth in 28 U.S.C.A. § 586 (West 2006). Con-
gress created the UST program in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, ch. 15, 92 Stat. 2549, 2651-57 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 581-589 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007)). The UST was made a part of
the Department of Justice rather than part of the court system to acknowledge the
separation of administrative and adjudicative functions as well as to emphasize the
UST's role as an enforcer of the bankruptcy laws. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 109
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6070-71.
There was, at one point, support for the creation of a more substantive adminis-
trative bankruptcy mechanism. See Mund, supra note 267, at 17 (as proposed by the
1973 Bankruptcy Commission, "[t]he United States Bankruptcy Administration was to
be created as an independent agency in the executive branch. It would receive the
filings in all cases (except railroad reorganizations), would handle all claims and the
first level of claims disputes, would generally administer every aspect of each con-
sumer bankruptcy case that did not require judicial intervention, and would supervise
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limited than that of the administrative apparatus associated with other
Article I powers. Although the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code enhanced the role of the USTs, their principal goal is to police
the bankruptcy system for signs of "cronyism" or debtor miscon-
duct.28 9 Most of the substantive work of bankruptcy-both adminis-
trative and judicial-is conducted not before the USTs, but in
bankruptcy courts.
Locating the bulk of bankruptcy work in courts rather than agen-
cies suggests four kinds of structural exceptionalism. First, and most
obviously, bankruptcy appears to be alone among the developed Arti-
cle I powers that is conducted almost entirely in courts and not (also)
in agencies. Moreover, Northern Pipeline's apparently unique articula-
tion of the (ostensibly exclusive) judicial role in resolving "private
rights" disputes suggests that much of bankruptcy work must be done
in courts.
Second, although bankruptcy is conducted in courts, it may also
be an extreme-that is, exceptional-example of what Judith Resnik
has called "managerial judging. '290 When judges act as "managers,"
Resnik has argued, they
learn more about cases much earlier than they did in the past. They
negotiate with parties about the course, timing, and scope of both
pretrial and posttrial litigation. These managerial responsibilities
give judges greater power. Yet the restraints that formerly circum-
scribed judicial authority are conspicuously absent. Managerial
judges frequently work beyond the public view, off the record, with
no obligation to provide written, reasoned opinions, and out of
reach of appellate review. 291
Resnik was concerned principally with federal judges who were called
on to manage complex system reform litigations in the 1960s and
1970s.2 92 Not surprisingly, given institutional constraints, federal dis-
trict court judges have, to some extent, moved beyond the managerial
various aspects of business liquidation and reorganization." (citing 1973 COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 226, at 94)). This failed for the same reason that bankruptcy
referees became bankruptcy judges-a political choice was made to make the bank-
ruptcy process judicial.
289 See Donna S. Tamanaha & Roberta A. DeAngelis, General Overview of the United
States Trustees Program, in UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF BANKRUPTcY & REORGANIZA-
TION 2006, at 257, 263-64 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series
No. A-890, 2006).
290 SeeJudith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982).
291 Id. at 378.
292 See id. at 397-99.
2008]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
model Resnik described.293 Nevertheless, given the highly administra-
tive nature of bankruptcy, bankruptcy judges remain exemplars of this
trend. Given the negotiated nature of much of bankruptcy-espe-
cially business cases in Chapter 11-it is not surprising that much of
the real work of bankruptcy judges does not follow the adversarial
common law template we generally associate with the judicial func-
tion. Although bankruptcy is more a creature of courts than any
other Article I power, it may be the least 'judicial" of those powers
placed in the judiciary.
This paradox-bankruptcy is conducted in courts but often does
not involve traditional adjudication-reflects a third way in which
bankruptcy is structurally exceptional: it is both over- and underinclu-
sive in ways unique to the federal judiciary. It is overinclusive because
it vests "original" (but not "exclusive") jurisdiction over non-Article
III-nonjudicial-matters in Article III courts. The many administra-
tive matters managed by bankruptcy courts may be a form of "manage-
rial judging" but, as noted above, there are real questions about the
boundaries of giving non-Article III powers to federal judges.294 We
tolerate this because we say that United States district courts "refer"
bankruptcy cases to bankruptcy judges, who are non-Article III actors.
But that leaves an anomaly: how can an Article III court have the juris-
diction to refer matters which it in theory lacks the power to address?
Yet, bankruptcy jurisdiction is also underinclusive, in the sense
that it gives to non-Article III actors powers that Northern Pipeline tells
us should be decided by Article III judges. A reasonable inference
from Northern Pipeline is that state private law matters must be
addressed by Article III courts, and not by other branches. This is
obviously problematic. A great deal of what bankruptcy courts do
would appear to violate even the narrow reading of Northern Pipeline
given in Union Carbide, which said Northern Pipeline applied only to
"traditional contract action [s] arising under state law, without consent
of the litigants."295 When there are disputes in bankruptcy, they often
involve state private law-indeed, most rights in bankruptcy derive in
the first instance from such law. Usually, when a bankruptcy judge
allows or disallows a disputed claim, she is "adjudicating" a matter of
"private" state law at contract, tort, etc. Moreover, bankruptcy
courts-not state courts-produce the vast majority of published
293 See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2004) (describing the transfor-
mation in system reform litigation from a "command and control" model to an
.experimentalist" model).
294 See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
295 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985).
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opinions on transactions under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, although this is a quintessential-and, to many, quintessentially
important-piece of private state contract law.29 6 To my knowledge,
no one argues that bankruptcy judges lack the power to decide these
or similar matters.
This may bespeak the final, and most salient, way in which bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction is constitutionally exceptional: as interesting and
difficult as these problems are conceptually, they may just not matter.
The meta-anomaly here may be that the exceptionalism of Northern
Pipeline and bankruptcy jurisdiction has had little affect on the day-to-
day operation of the system. By contrast, organic exceptionalism, and
the exceptional treatment of vertical relations, discussed above,297
have influenced, and will likely continue to influence, how bankruptcy
is conducted.
To be sure, there are border questions. There will be fights over
a bankruptcy court's power to address noncore matters "related to" a
bankruptcy case 298 or personal injury tort claims, or to conduct jury
trials, among other things. But the real core of the bankruptcy power
itself rests on a constitutionally unstable blend of powers and duties
that we tolerate ultimately because of the nature of bankruptcy. In
theory, we could place much of the work of bankruptcy in a federal
agency. But we would nevertheless have to contend with the "private"
rights that, according to the Northern Pipeline plurality, must be adjudi-
cated in an Article III court. We could, instead, make all bankruptcy
judges Article III judges, although the administrative nature of bank-
ruptcy work creates the equal and opposite problem: how much "man-
agerial" and administrative work would we tolerate in bankruptcy
judges vested with Article III status?
The answer must be that, at some important level, we just don't
care. The reality is that, Northern Pipeline notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court seems generally inclined to tolerate ever-expanding
bankruptcy jurisdiction, as implied by such cases as Granfinanciera99
296 See Plank, Article III, supra note 6, at 568-69 (" [B] ankruptcyjudges adjudicate a
substantial part of the commercial law cases in this country, and their decisions guide
businesses and their lawyers in structuring transactions. Thus, the initial adjudica-
tions of bankruptcy judges have a great impact on the lives of citizens.").
297 See supra Parts II-III.A.
298 See generally Brubaker, supra note 6, at 747-48 ("The Supreme Court's abstruse-
ness is, of course, fuel for the scholarly engine, and bankruptcy has become the seem-
ingly inscrutable crucible of federal jurisdiction theory.").
299 See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 64 (1989) (preserving ajury
trial right for a fraudulent conveyance defendant who has not filed proof of claim and
indicating that bankruptcy courts may have power to conduct jury trials).
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and the recent decision in Anna Nicole Smith's bankruptcy. 300 These
realities are, in turn, driven in large part by the exigencies of financial
distress. We need to get bankruptcy work done somewhere, and the
system we have-for all its conceptual anomalies-is as good as any.
Bankruptcy jurisdiction may, in other words, be "exceptional" in this
sense, but not necessarily "special."
IV. SUBSTANTIVE PUZZLES; SUBSTANTIVE EXCEPTIONALISM
The preceding Part developed two structural puzzles in bank-
ruptcy-vertical and horizontal-and suggested that they bespeak
various forms of exceptionalism. Bankruptcy also creates puzzles
involving the interaction between the bankruptcy power and "substan-
tive" protections guaranteed by, among other things, the Bill of
Rights. This Part catalogues three: those involving property, due pro-
cess, 30 1 and religious liberty.
I should note at the outset that evidence of exceptionalism is
weakest here. In these and other cases of clashes between the bank-
ruptcy power and substantive constitutional protections, it is always
possible that it is the constitutional protection-and not bank-
ruptcy-that has changed over time, thus exhibiting "exceptional"
tendencies for reasons having nothing to do with bankruptcy. In each
case, the observations of exceptional constitutional treatment may say
as much about the instability of these doctrinal categories as it does
about bankruptcy's affect on them.
A. Property
Property is a category of rights central both to bankruptcy and to
the Constitution. Much of the logic of bankruptcy is organized
around property. Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here,
the commencement of a bankruptcy case "creates an estate"30 2 com-
prised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case. °30 3 The Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, of course, protects against uncompensated "takings" of
property.3
0 4
300 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 312 (2006) (holding that a bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction over a widow's claim that her stepson tortiously interfered with
her expectancy of inheritance or gift from her deceased husband).
301 I recognize that "due process" is largely a procedural, not substantive, concept.
I use the term "substantive" in this Part merely to distinguish this class of puzzles and
exceptions from organic and structural ones discussed above.
302 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
303 Id. § 541 (a)(1).
304 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Solving property problems in bankruptcy involves three steps.
First, a bankruptcy court must determine whether the rights in ques-
tion would be "property" under state private law, as required by Butner
v. United States.305 Thus, because the Uniform Commercial Code
treats security interests under Article 9 as a species of property, so too
must bankruptcy. 306  The same may be said of real property
mortgages.307
Second, a court must determine whether a federal bankruptcy
rule impairs that interest. There seems to be little question that bank-
ruptcy law does significantly impair property rights prospectively,
although how far that may go is not clear. The automatic stay of § 362
prevents the secured creditor from foreclosing; 30 8 § 363 permits a
court to sell encumbered collateral free of a lien, the security interest
to attach to the proceeds;30 9 § 364 empowers the bankruptcy court to
grant senior liens on the collateral under certain circumstances;
310
and § 1129(b)(2) empowers a debtor to "cramdown" a plan against
the objection of the secured creditor, meaning that the secured claim
can be reduced to the value of the collateral and paid over an
extended period of time.3
Third, and perhaps most difficult for our purposes, a court must
determine whether these or other impairments offend the Takings
Clause of the Constitution.3 1 2 Most discussions about Takings Clause
protection for property interests in bankruptcy start with the cases
that arose under the Frazier-Lemke Act, emergency legislation
enacted during the Depression to stay foreclosures on family farms.
313
305 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (" [P] roperty interests are created and defined by state
law.").
306 See U.C.C. § 1-201 (b) (35) (2001) ("'Security interest' means an interest in per-
sonal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.").
307 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (1997) ("A mortgage is
a conveyance or retention of an interest in real property as security for performance
of an obligation.").
308 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
309 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000). This means that secured creditors may not con-
trol property prior to sale or have any direct influence on the sale.
310 See id. § 364(d). This section requires that the court first find that the original
secured creditor is "adequately protected." Id. § 364(d) (1) (B). But if the property
right the creditor bargained for was first priority, and that first priority is the property
interest, this may go "too far."
311 See id. § 1129(b)(2). The plan must be "fair and equitable" to the secured
creditor, which in this context means the creditor receives the "indubitable
equivalent" of the value of the collateral. See id. § 1129(b) (2) (A) (iii).
312 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
313 Frazier-Lemke amended the bankruptcy law then in existence by adding sub-
section (s) to § 75. See Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934) (amended 1935).
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Under Frazier-Lemke, farm foreclosures were halted for five years,
and farmers were given the right to repurchase their farms at the
appraised value, even if that may have been less than the outstanding
debt secured by the farm.314 During the stay period, farmers were
required to pay a "reasonable rental" to their creditors.3 15
The first case to consider the constitutionality of Frazier-Lemke,
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,316 famously held that the
stay of foreclosure without compensation effected a taking and was
impermissible under the Fifth Amendment.317 Justice Brandeis, writ-
ing for a unanimous Court on "Black Monday" (May 27, 1935, when
the Court struck down two other New Deal initiatives3 18 ), held that
Frazier-Lemke violated state law property rights to retain a lien until
paid, to have a judicial sale of the collateral, and to control the prop-
erty while the debtor was in default.319 "The bankruptcy power," Jus-
tice Brandeis wrote,
like the other great substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the
Fifth Amendment. Under the bankruptcy power Congress may dis-
charge the debtor's personal obligation, because, unlike the States,
it is not prohibited from impairing the obligation of contracts. But
the effect of the Act here complained of is not the discharge of
Radford's personal obligation. It is the taking of substantive rights
in specific property acquired by the Bank prior to the Act.
3 20
If we had only Radford to worry about, we would be forgiven for
thinking that liens are kinds of property interests that bankruptcy can-
not take away, at least retroactively. However, shortly after Radford,
Congress amended Frazier-Lemke to reduce the moratorium from
five to three years and to give courts the power to lift the stay.32' This,
too, was challenged, in Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust
Bank.3 22 Here, however, the Court upheld the Act.3 23 As Professor
Frazier-Lemke expired on March 1, 1949. See Act of Apr. 21, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-
495, 62 Stat. 198.
314 See Frazier-Lemke Act, § 75(s)(7), 48 Stat. at 1291.
315 See id.
316 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
317 See id. at 601-02.
318 See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935) (invalidating
the President's power to remove a commissioner from the Federal Trade Commis-
sion); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935)
(invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act).
319 See Radford, 295 U.S. at 594-95.
320 Id. at 589-90 (internal footnote and citation omitted).
321 See Act of Aug. 28, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-384, § 6, 49 Stat. 942, 944.
322 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
323 See id. at 470.
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Ayer has noted, the difference in result may have been due to the fact
that the Court had "not so much seen the light as felt the heat."
324
While the changes to the Act were not wholly immaterial, "under both
versions, the creditor was barred from foreclosure for long periods of
time, during which the debtor remained in possession, obliged to pay
over no more than what the property, after necessary expenses, would
yield."
3 25
Surveying the state of affairs as it existed in the early 1980s, Pro-
fessor Rogers concluded, quite reasonably, that the belief that per-
fected liens were protected in bankruptcy by the Takings Clause was
simply false. 326 Indeed, a number of statist scholars expressly avoid
characterizing liens as property interests on the theory that doing so
injects an appearance of certainty and gravitas that the law in action
does not support.
3 27
Although there has been a recent tendency on the Court to take
property interests more seriously,3 28 it is unlikely that any existing pro-
vision of the Bankruptcy Code offends the Fifth Amendment. Rather,
the more interesting question involves congressional power to impair
vested property interests retroactively. Here, the Court has given con-
flicting signals. At times, the Court seems to take the problem of ret-
roactivity seriously. For example, in United States v. Security Industrial
Bank,3 29 the Court held that retroactive avoidance of certain liens
under § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code might have violated the Tak-
324 Ayer, supra note 4, at 983.
325 Id.
326 See Rogers, supra note 6, at 985 ("In context, Justice Brandeis' comments [in
Radford] suggest that the holding of the case is only that the modification of secured
creditors' rights effected by the Frazier-Lemke Act was too substantial to permit the
Act to be applied retroactively. Thus, the famous statement that the bankruptcy
power is subject to the fifth amendment must be taken to mean nothing more than
that the fifth amendment, through either the due process or the takings clause, is the
constitutional foundation for the proposition that statutes that retroactively disrupt
settled expectations may be subject to particularly attentive judicial scrutiny." (foot-
note omitted)).
327 See, e.g., id. at 1020.
328 See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 503-04 (1998) (plurality opinion);
Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan-
ning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 728 (1997); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 236-37
(1997); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of
Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 605 (1993);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827
(1987).
329 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
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ings Clause.3 30 That section identified a class of liens-nonpossessory,
nonpurchase money liens on certain types of consumer goods-that
could be avoided by a consumer debtor. 33 1 The challenge involved
only liens of that sort created before enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code-meaning that if the liens were to be avoided, it would be
because the Bankruptcy Code applied retroactively
3 32
The Security Industrial Bank Court had little trouble concluding
that the liens would not be avoided, but the basis for the conclusion is
not completely clear. On the one hand, then-Justice Rehnquist
devoted a considerable amount of his discussion to the notion that
"[t]he bankruptcy power is subject to the Fifth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against taking private property. 3 33 Thus, avoidance of the liens
would not be viewed as a (permissible) "regulatory" taking, but rather
as "a complete destruction of the property right of the secured
party. '334 Like the debtor-repurchase provisions of the Frazier-Lemke
Act struck down in Radford, and the federal government's attempts to
prevent junior lienholders from foreclosing in Armstrong v. United
States,3 35 retroactive lien avoidance would effect "' [t] he total destruc-
tion by the Government of all value of these liens, which constitute
compensable property, [and which have] every possible element of a
Fifth Amendment taking."'
336
On the other hand, the Security Industrial Bank opinion may really
turn on judicial conventions about retroactivity, in general, and the
interpretation of Congress' intent about that in this particular case.
Here, Congress made the job of determining its intent on retroactivity
comparatively easy. An early version of the legislation had contained
an explicit requirement that all of its provisions "shall apply in all
cases or proceedings instituted after its effective date, regardless of the
330 Id. at 78, 82.
331 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (renumbered 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f) (1) (B) by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 303, 108
Stat. 4106, 4132 (1994)).
332 Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 86.
333 Id. at 75 (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589
(1935)).
334 Id.; see also id. at 76 ("The 'bundle of rights' which accrues to a secured party is
obviously smaller than that which accrues to an owner in fee simple, but the Govern-
ment cites no cases supporting the proposition that differences such as these relegate
the secured party's interest to something less than property.").
335 364 U.S. 40, 46 (1962). Here, the federal government seized unfinished navy
boats after default by the prime contractor and thus prohibited materialmen from
enforcing their liens. Id. at 41. The Court held this to be a compensable taking. Id.
at 48.
336 Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 77 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48).
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occurrence of any of the operative facts determining legal rights,
duties or liabilities hereunder."337 But this provision was deleted,
which the Court took to be "some evidence that it did not intend to
depart from the usual principle of construction" against retroactive
application. 3
38
Security Industrial Bank's ambiguity is captured in a key sentence
that blurs the issues: "[n] o bankruptcy law shall be construed to elimi-
nate property rights which existed before the law was enacted in the
absence of an explicit command from Congress."33 9 This sentence
starts out sounding like it means business about protecting vested
property rights-"no bankruptcy law shall be construed to eliminate
property rights which existed before the law was enacted." But Justice
Rehnquist's opinion does not stop there. Rather, he seems to recog-
nize a caveat if the law is supported by "an explicit command from
Congress." Does this therefore mean that an explicit Congressional
command under the Bankruptcy Clause could eliminate vested prop-
erty rights?
Not surprisingly, reasonable minds appear to differ as to whether
Security Industrial Bank really expresses a Fifth Amendment limitation
on the Bankruptcy Clause. 340 Certainly, the fact that the case was
about the application of a lien avoidance provision to preexisting liens
must mean that there was something special about the retroactive
application of the law. The Court did not seem especially concerned
about prospective lien avoidance, which suggests that the Fifth Amend-
ment issue may be more about the timing of the legislation than it is
about its substantive effect on property rights. This makes a certain
amount of sense, as the problem of reliance is materially different
depending when the new law applies. It is much harder for secured
creditors to claim a taking if they acquire a lien on property having
reason to know that the bankruptcy process itself may not respect that
lien.
337 Id. at 81 (quoting H.R. 31, 94th Cong. § 10-103(a) (1st Sess. 1975), reprinted in
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. app. at 321 (1976)).
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Compare Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 FLA. L. REV. 851, 869
(1999) ("The Supreme Court more recently confirmed its continued support for the
proposition that bankruptcy law is subject to the Takings Clause in United States v.
Security Industrial Bank."), with Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Impairing Liens Under
Bankruptcy Code Section 5220l: One Step Forward and One Step Back, 70 U. CoLo. L. REV.
1, 11 (1999) ("When finally presented with the question of whether section 522(f)
violated the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court managed to circumvent the issue
[in United States v. Security Industrial Bank].").
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Of course, some would say that the mere presence of a Bank-
ruptcy Clause is fair warning that all property bets are off in bank-
ruptcy-regardless of the effective date of the legislation. Professor
Rogers observes that Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Security Industrial
Bank ignored a history of applying bankruptcy laws retroactively:
Before the time of the Radford decision, the federal courts had
almost invariably approached questions concerning the constitu-
tionality of bankruptcy legislation exclusively in terms of the sub-
stantive scope of the bankruptcy power, and this analysis appears to
have been regarded as an approach applicable to retroactive as well
as prospective applications of the bankruptcy power and to cases
involving secured creditors' rights as well as those involving
unsecured creditors' rights. In fact, the cases from In re Klein
through Rock Island, . . . from the perspective of the source of con-
stitutional limitations on the substantive scope of bankruptcy legisla-
tion, all appear to have involved retroactive application of newly
enacted bankruptcy legislation. Moreover, the Canada Southern and
Rock Island cases both involved retroactive impairments of secured
creditors' "property" rights. Yet in all of these cases, the constitu-
tional issues were viewed solely as questions of the scope of the
bankruptcy power.
3 4 1
While the cases discussed in this excerpt undoubtedly approved
retroactive application of bankruptcy law, they appear not to have
affected property in quite the way that concerned the Security Indus-
trial Bank Court. In re Klein did not involve lien avoidance, but instead
the grant of a discharge under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 for a
debtor who, in conformity with the Act, had ceded his property, which
had been distributed to his creditors.3 42 The impairments in both
Canada Southern3 43 and Rock Island 4 4 were retroactive, but were not
lien avoidances. 345 Rather, both involved the effectiveness of stays of
foreclosure. 346 For those like Justice Rehnquist, who believe retroac-
tivity must stop at lien avoidance, Professor Rogers' argument may not
be wholly satisfactory.
341 Rogers, supra note 6, at 1014-16 (footnotes omitted).
342 See In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 716, 716 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 7865).
343 Can. S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
344 Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. (Rock Island),
294 U.S. 648 (1935).
345 See id. at 663 n.4.; Can. S. Ry., 109 U.S. at 530-32.
346 In Rock Island, the stay was temporary, pending plan confirmation. See Rock
Island, 294 U.S. at 663. In Canada Southern, the injunction was approved by an act of
the Canadian Parliament, which was considered binding by the Court. See Can. S. Ry.,
109 U.S. at 536.
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That said, there is in fact support for the view that Congress may
retroactively disturb vested property rights, although it may have to
pay just compensation for doing so. In the Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases (The 3R Act Cases),3 4 7 the major creditors and a stockholder
of the Penn Central Railroad challenged the constitutionality of the
Regional Railroad Reorganization Act of 1973 ("Rail Act"), and
alleged that the conveyance of railroad properties to Conrail and the
mandatory continuation of money-losing rail services effected a taking
under the Fifth Amendment.3 48 The Court held that the reorganiza-
tion plan, which forced the creditors to accept stock in an insolvent
successor (Conrail), did not constitute an impermissible taking, since
the plaintiffs were effectively entitled to indemnification by the fed-
eral government under the Tucker Act.
349
The key point in the 3R Act Cases is that the Rail Act did effect a
taking.350 But, the taking was constitutionally permissible because it
was compensated by the federal government:
We hold . . . that while the conveyance provisions of the Rail Act
might raise serious constitutional questions if a Tucker Act suit were
precluded, the availability of the Tucker Act guarantees an ade-
quate remedy at law for any taking which might occur as a result of
the final-conveyance provisions. Further, with the Tucker Act rem-
edy, the payment of "fair and equitable consideration" in compli-
ance with the reorganization statutes is assured, and procedural due
process is satisfied.
3 5 '
The idea that property may form the outer boundary of the bank-
ruptcy power is attractive but ultimately problematic. It is attractive
because, unlike in personam rights that can be discharged with little
controversy, property is ostensibly an in rem right protected by the
Fifth Amendment. Coming after the Bankruptcy Clause in the text,
one might think that, whatever other private rights Congress may
347 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
348 The takings challenge asserted that the Rail Act was effectively an eminent
domain statute and, because compensation was not in cash but largely in stock of a
successor entity (Conrail), necessarily worked an unconstitutional taking. See id. at
137.
349 The Tucker Act confers jurisdiction on the Court of Claims
to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded
either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sound-
ing in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1) (2000).
350 Cf The 3R Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 148-50.
351 Id. at 149.
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trample under the bankruptcy power, the Framers of the Bill of Rights
have told us that property is not among them.
Yet, this conventional wisdom is only as good as our understand-
ing of property. A discussion of the nature of property is obviously
well beyond the scope of this Article. It is, however, no secret that
property is a juridical concept whose meaning and force have long
been contested, and which remains in flux. If we do not know what
constitutes property under state private law, then saying that it forms
the limit of the bankruptcy power may tell us very little.
Moreover, this fails to account for two ways that bankruptcy
exceptionalism creeps into the treatment of property. First, even if
bankruptcy treats property interests more seriously than other entitle-
ments, it nevertheless has a way of diluting and distorting those rights
in significant ways. The powers to stay foreclosure, to assume or reject
leases and licenses, to sell encumbered property and to "cram" a lien
down, among others, alter property rights in very significant ways. At
the end of the day, bankruptcy lawyers take some comfort in the idea
that the holder of property rights gets the "indubitable equivalent"
value of the property, at least if the property is a lien.3 5 2 But all this
really means is that the lien holder probably gets more cash than if it
had only a contract claim.
Second, it forces us to confront the exceptionalism implicit in the
in terrorem conception of the Bankruptcy Clause. It is unlikely that a
democratically elected Congress can negate prospectively or retro-
spectively all property interests in bankruptcy. But how far Congress
can go-and how far is "too far"3 53-has yet to be determined,
although there will likely be mounting pressure to find out. The
greatest pressure will involve retroactive relief. If, for example, the
Bankruptcy Clause does create the kind of in terrorem power described
in Part II.B, it may be that the Framers actually did intend to permit
retroactive elimination of vested property rights such as liens. As we
have seen, this may have been the case with one iteration of South
Carolina's colonial bankruptcy law.354 A democratically elected Con-
gress would, on this view, have the power under the Bankruptcy
352 This phrase is codified in § 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, and derived origi-
nally from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941,
942 (2d Cir. 1935). See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (A) (iii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); S. Rep.
No. 95-989, at 127 (1978) ("The indubitable equivalent language [in
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)] is intended to follow the strict approach taken by Judge
Learned Hand in In re Murel Holding Corp." (citation omitted)).
353 Cf Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1982) ("[11f regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking.").
354 See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text
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Clause to enact legislation to address serious existing financial crises,
even if that meant upsetting vested property rights to some extent.
If so, a court's task in reviewing retroactive bankruptcy legislation
would be to weigh the severity of the financial crisis that led Congress
to act against the violence its use of the bankruptcy power does to
vested property rights. On this analysis, the Radford case might come
out differently, but Security Industrial Bank might come out the same.
In Radford, the Court struck down legislation enacted in the face of
the Depression, which most would agree was a serious crisis. By con-
trast, no similar crisis confronted Congress when it enacted § 522(f),
which was struck down in Security Industrial Bank. Wright's ultimate
acceptance of a modified form of the Frazier-Lemke Act may be evi-
dence that the Court in fact is willing to engage in this sort of balanc-
ing analysis. 355 If so, we may find that bankruptcy permits greater
adjustments of property rights than other constitutional powers.
B. Due Process
A recurrent constitutional problem in bankruptcy involves due
process, the protection provided under the Fifth Amendment to some
sort of notice and hearing before rights can be taken away. 3 5 6 In most
bankruptcy cases, due process is not a large issue. Although the auto-
matic stay of debt collection and the discharge of debt require no
actual notice to creditors, there is little question that bankruptcy's
basic operations pass procedural muster.
The big due process problems generally arise in mass tort bank-
ruptcy cases. Companies such as the Dow Corning Corporation, 357
the A.H. Robins Company,35 8 and countless asbestos manufacturers 59
355 See supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
356 U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated...
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections.").
357 See Lindsey v. O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers of
Conn. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 485-87 (6th Cir. 1996) (providing the
factual and procedural background of the breast implant litigation); In re Dow Corn-
ing Corp., No. 95-20512, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1123, at *1-2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 9,
1995) (discussing the Dow Corning bankruptcy, which resulted from litigation over
breast implants); see also Marcus Cole, Limiting Liability Through Bankruptcy, 70 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1245, 1271-74 (2002) (describing the In re Dow Coming litigation).
358 In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 700 (4th Cir. 1989); A.H. Robins Co. v.
Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1008 (4th Cir. 1986); Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 79, 103-04; Georgene M.
Vairo, Georgine, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass 7rt Claims
2008]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
have all discharged mass tort liability in Chapter 11 reorganizations.
Although the answers are complex, the due process questions are sim-
ple: how much notice should be given, to what end, and how much
dignitary face time in court should future claimants enjoy?
For those creditors who have already sued, or for whom the injury
is manifest, there is a general sense that notice by publication and the
like will suffice. The problem is that these cases seek to discharge
liability for all "claims" that exist as of the commencement of the
bankruptcy, and the term "claim" is defined very broadly, to include
those that may be contingent, disputed, unliquidated, or unma-
tured.360 In other words, the mass tort bankruptcy seeks to discharge
both actual and latent claims. But latency means that in many cases,
the victim-creditor will not know that that he or she in fact has an
injury. Thus, no amount of notice could be meaningful.
The complex mechanism we have developed to address these
sorts of claims is the "channeling injunction." This is an injunction
that supplements the general discharge granted in a reorganization
plan under Chapter 11. The rules on channeling injunctions are con-
tained in Bankruptcy Code § 5 24 (g) .361 They are highly complex,
although the basic idea is that "future" claimants-meaning those
who have claims that were latent when the debtor went into bank-
ruptcy-can only recover for their injuries through a trust funded by
Resolution, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 79, 129 (1997); Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61 FoRDiHAM L. RFv. 617, 629-30 (1992).
See generally S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, CASE STUDIES OF MASS TORT LIMITED FUND CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS & BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS 187-217 (2000) (summarizing
the A.H. Robins Co. Dalkon Shield litigation); RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW
(1991) (same).
359 Scores, if not hundreds, of companies are affected by potential liability for
asbestos exposure, and many have commenced bankruptcy cases to manage that lia-
bility. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGA-
TION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT, at vi-vii (2002) (estimating that
by the end of 2000, 600,000 people had filed claims naming over 6000 companies as
defendants, and $54 billion had been spent on litigation); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Asbes-
tos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study for Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations on Joint and
Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 203, 205 (2003); Michelle J. White, Why the Asbestos
Genie Won't Stay in the Bankruptcy Bottle, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1319, 1322 (2002); see also,
e.g., Findley v. Blinken (In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d 721, 753 (2d
Cir. 1992); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636,
639 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Armstrong World Indus., 320 B.R. 523, 524-25 (D. Del.
2005).
360 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
361 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000).
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the debtor as part of its reorganization plan. Their claims are "chan-
neled" to, and paid from, the trust.362
We can see how exceptional bankruptcy is when we contrast it
with the rules that would govern the settlement of mass tort class
actions outside bankruptcy. Settlements under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure embed a variety of procedural protections for class
actions, including that "the claims . . . of the representative parties
[must be] typical of the claims ... of the class" and "the representative
parties [must] fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class."' 363 Two recent cases, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsoa 64 and
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,3 65 interpret these standards quite stringently,
making the settlement of mass torts in class action litigation much
more difficult.
3 6 6
The Bankruptcy Code, by contrast, gives debtors (or other plan
proponents) significant discretion in classifying claims. Under Bank-
ruptcy Code § 1122(a) "a plan may place a claim or an interest in a
particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to
the other claims or interests of such class. '3 67 Bankruptcy has thus
become an even more attractive medium through which to discharge
mass tort liability.
We know that bankruptcy's looser standards are acceptable
because Ortiz embraces a kind of bankruptcy exceptionalism. The
Court cites bankruptcy as an example of an exceptional situation
involving a "special remedial scheme" that permissibly "'foreclos[es]
successive litigation by nonlitigants.' "368 The "protections for credi-
362 See, e.g., Katherine M. Anand, Note, Demanding Due Process: The Constitutionality
of the § 524 Channeling Injunction and Trust Mechanisms That Effectively Discharge Asbestos
Claims in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1194-97 (2005)
(discussing the adoption of § 524 in response to difficulties with Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation in asbestos cases).
363 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
364 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
365 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
366 See id. at 821 ("We hold that applicants for contested [class] certification on [a
limited find theory] must show that the fund is limited by more than the agreement
of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a
process addressing any conflicting interest of class members."); Amchem, 521 U.S. at
628 ("[W]e have concluded that the class in this case cannot satisfy [Rule 23's]
requirements of common issue predominance and adequacy of representation . ).
367 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2000).
368 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846 (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989)).
In Martin v. Wilks, the Court had noted that bankruptcy and probate are examples of
"legal proceedings [that] may terminate preexisting rights [of nonlitigants] if the
scheme is otherwise consistent with due process." Martin, 490 U.S. at 762 n.2.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tors built into the Bankruptcy Code"3 69 were somehow greater than
the "'structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the
diverse groups and individuals affected"' by the Amchem and Ortiz set-
tlements. 370 Thus, as Professor Gibson has observed, "the Court's view
may be that bankruptcy differs from class actions in significant
respects that render inapplicable the strict classification requirements
that due process may otherwise require for class action certifica-
tion." 37 1 This, however, would simply be another way of saying that
bankruptcy may be an exception to received notions of due process.
C. Religious Liberty
A third source of conflict between the bankruptcy power and sub-
stantive civil liberties involves religious freedom. The First Amend-
ment of the Constitution is the source of protection for religious
liberty, providing that neither federal nor state governments may
make any law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." 3 72 Although problems involving religious
liberty in bankruptcy are not likely as common as those involving
property and due process, they appear to be increasing in frequency
and difficulty.
The principal current examples involve the Catholic diocese
bankruptcy cases. As is well known, many dioceses have incurred sig-
nificant liability, through judgment or settlement, for sexual miscon-
duct by priests.3 73 As of this writing, the most recent filing was by the
Diocese of San Diego which listed assets and liabilities in excess of
$100 million.
374
A central question is whether religious liberty principles, as
expressed through the First Amendment, or statutory supplements
such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),375 prevent a
bankruptcy court from displacing diocesan management by
369 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 860 n.34.
370 Id. at 856 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627).
371 S. Elizabeth Gibson, A Response to Professor Resnick: Will This Vehicle Pass Inspec-
tion?, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2095, 2109 (2000).
372 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
373 The factual background to the scandal can be found in archives maintained by
The Poynter Institute and the National Catholic Reporter. See Abuse Tracker, http://
www.bishop-accountability.org/AbuseTracker (last visited Jan. 9, 2008); Poynter
Online-Abuse Tracker, http://poynter.org/column.asp?id=46 (last visited Jan. 9,
2008). See generally Lipson, Churches, supra note 6 (describing the background of cer-
tain diocesan bankruptcy cases).
374 See Moran, supra note 33.
375 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2000), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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appointing a Chapter 11 trustee. There is support for the proposition
that RFRA may defeat application of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus
prevent a bankruptcy court from dislodging management, even if in
violation of the Bankruptcy Code. 376 In In re Young, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that RFRA trumped
§ 548 of the Bankruptcy Code-the constructive fraudulent convey-
ance provisions. 377 There is no obvious reason why RFRA would not
also apply to Bankruptcy Code §§ 1104 and 1106, which govern the
appointment of trustees to displace management, and the duties of
management when acting as debtor-in-possession.
3 78
We also know that RFRA presented a serious question in the case
of the Portland Diocese. There, tort claimants sought declarations
that parish property belonged to the debtor's estate and that any
unrecorded trusts for the benefit of parishioners should be avoided
under § 544(a) (3) of the Bankruptcy Code. 379 Judge Perris held that
avoidance of these unrecorded interests might create a substantial
burden on parishioners' exercise of religion under RFRA: "[Ilf appli-
cation of [the Bankruptcy Code] leaves the parishioners and school
children with no place to worship and study, because no facilities are
available, and if they establish that worship and study are central to
religious doctrine, the burden [on their exercise of religion] could be
substantial." 38
0
Yet, if history is any guide, the Court may not care whether bank-
ruptcy burdens religious exercise. The important example here
involves the experience of the Church of Latter-Day Saints (LDS) in
the late nineteenth century, where the federal government engaged
376 RFRA's stated purposes are:
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner
and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim
or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government.
Id. § 2000bb(b) (internal citations omitted).
377 See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407,
1420 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
378 See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1104 & 1106 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
379 See Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (In re Roman Catho-
lic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 868, 875-76 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005).
380 See Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (In re Roman Catho-
lic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 864 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005); see also id.
at 863 ("The possibility that the result of [avoidance of these interests] could be the
loss of all parish church and Archdiocesan school properties titled in [the] debtor's
name raises a question of fac t  cegarding whether application of § 544(a) (3) would
impose a substantial burden on the parishioners' exercise of religion.").
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in a relentless battle to outlaw the "barbarous" practice of plural mar-
riage.381 In Late Corp. of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States,3 8 2 the LDS challenged federal legislation that dissolved
the church corporation, appointed a federal equity receiver, and
caused the church's property to escheat to the federal government, a
process similar to involuntary bankruptcy under current law, but with
the proceeds going to the government rather than creditors.38 3 The
LDS objected to the legislation on, among others, religious liberty
grounds.38 4 The Supreme Court was wholly unmoved by their
concerns:
It is distinctly stated in the pleadings and findings of fact, that the
property of the [church] corporation was held for the purpose of
religious and charitable uses. But it is also stated in the findings of
fact, and is a matter of public notoriety, that the religious and chari-
table uses intended to be subserved and promoted are the inculca-
tion and spread of the doctrines and usages of the Mormon
Church, or Church of Latter-Day Saints, one of the distinguishing
features of which is the practice of polygamy-a crime against the
laws, and abhorrent to the sentiments and feelings of the civilized
world. Notwithstanding the stringent laws which have been passed
by Congress-notwithstanding all the efforts made to suppress this
barbarous practice-the sect ... perseveres, in defiance of law, in
preaching, upholding, promoting and defending it.38 5
Not surprisingly, the Latter-Day Saints case and its progeny are
often held up as examples of the worst disingenuity in our thinking
about religious liberty.3 86 These are exceedingly ugly decisions, which
381 Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890).
382 136 U.S. 1.
383 Id. at 8-10. In 1862, Congress enacted legislation to "annul all acts and laws
which establish, maintain, protect, or countenance the practice of polygamy." Act of
July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 2, 12 Stat. 501, 501 (repealed 1910). Congress recruited
debtor-creditor law in its effort, providing in the 1862 legislation that
[i]t shall not be lawful for any corporation or association for religious or
charitable purposes to acquire or hold real estate in any Territory of the
United States during the existence of the territorial government of a greater
value than fifty thousand dollars; and all real estate acquired or held by any
such corporation or association contrary to the provisions of this act shall be
forfeited and escheat to the United States: Provided, That existing vested
rights in real estate shall not be impaired by the provisions of this section.
Id. § 3, 12 Stat. at 501-02.
384 Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 10-12.
385 Id. at 48-49.
386 See Lipson, Churches, supra note 6, at 412. Related cases include Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 347-48 (1890) (upholding a law requiring Mormons to swear
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many would probably rather deny than defend. 387 Yet, they remain
"good" law in the sense that people like Justice Scalia cite them as
precedent when denying religious liberty protections.3 18
The parallels are disturbing. Like Latter-Day Saints and its sib-
lings, the diocesan cases harness economic restructuring to remedy
perceived sexual misconduct by religious actors or institutions. If a
variant of bankruptcy-involuntary, highly selective bankruptcy, no
less-can be used to reform the LDS, why should Catholic dioceses be
any different? Perhaps the Mormon experience is further evidence
that bankruptcy, or its analogues, have the potential to generate
exceptions to constitutional rules, standards, norms, and values.
V. TowARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY
The prior three Parts developed evidence that in many contexts,
and in many different ways, bankruptcy has the capacity to create
exceptions to generally accepted constitutional rules, standards,
norms, and values. Exceptionalism may thus be an operating princi-
ple behind the constitutional puzzles of bankruptcy. But exceptional-
ism is not a constitutional theory; it is a description of what appears to
be happening, not a statement of what should be happening, or why.
Nor can it tell us when, exactly, exceptions should be made. When
Congress or ajudge feels like it? When we (whoever "we" may be) like
the result?
This Part has three goals. First, it distinguishes the descriptive
exceptionalism we have seen from a prescriptive or normative case for
exceptionalism that might be made. I argue that there is an under-
standable reluctance to embrace bankruptcy exceptionalism. The
next two subparts offer thoughts on how to contain this exceptional-
ism within credible constitutional tolerances.
they were not polygamists), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (holding that the practice of polyg-
amy was not protected by the Free Exercise Clause).
387 Edward Gaffney, Jr., Dean of the Valparaiso University School of Law,
described the treatment of the LDS as akin to "the sort of dictatorial rule that one
associates with Henry VIII's dissolution of the monasteries in sixteenth century
England, not with the spirit of the First Amendment." See Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 153 (1992) (statement of Edward McGlynn
Gaffney, Jr., Dean, Valparaiso School of Law) (citation omitted).
388 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885, 890 (1990) (citing Reynolds
and holding that the Free Exercise Clause creates no exemptions from "neutral" laws
of general application).
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A. Descriptive v. Prescriptive Exceptionalism
While bankruptcy may in fact have been accorded exceptional
constitutional treatment in a number of circumstances, this is not to
say that it should. There is a world of difference between descriptive
exceptionalism and normative exceptionalism. Many would disavow
either form of exceptionalism. The Supreme Court would appear to
be reluctant to acknowledge those features of bankruptcy that are
exceptional. According to the Northern Pipeline plurality, for example,
bankruptcy was not one of the "exceptional powers bestowed upon
Congress by the Constitution or by historical consensus" that would
justify deviation from the "categorical" approach to Article III powers
it envisioned. 389 Similarly, Ralph Brubaker has argued that we should
have "extreme skepticism" for "widespread (but troublesome) 'bank-
ruptcy is different' instincts."3 9° Brubaker has
discovered time and time again that bankruptcy is not sui generis.
Although the bankruptcy process is inherently more complex than
most general civil litigation, breaking down that complex process
into its constituent elements consistently reveals that the federal
bankruptcy process is best understood and explained in the same
fashion as all other aspects of federal jurisdiction and procedure,
using conventional federal jurisdiction theory. Thus, the limits on
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction should also come from the limits
generally applicable to the federal courts. If those limits come from
nowhere other than the constitutional limits of the Bankruptcy
Power itself, there is good reason to fear that there are no meaning-
ful limits on federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.
39 1
The desire to fit bankruptcy smoothly into the larger existing
jurisdictional-and constitutional-framework is understandable. It
is discomforting to think that bankruptcy is different. If it is different
it may, for example, be inferior-which, as discussed in Part III.B
above, is effectively how its practice was treated from enactment of the
Chandler Act in 1938 to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.3 9 2 The 1978 Act
389 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982)
(plurality opinion); see also id. at 71 ("We discern no such exceptional grant of power
applicable in the cases before us."); cf. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improve-
ment Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 538 (1936) (Cardozo,J., dissenting) ("To read into
the bankruptcy clause an exception or proviso to the effect that there shall be no
disturbance of the federal framework by any bankruptcy proceeding is to do no more
than has been done already with reference to the power of taxation by decisions
known of all men.").
390 Brubaker, supra note 160, at 97.
391 Id. at 133-34.
392 SKEEL, supra note 266, at 132-36.
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was generally viewed as successful in part because it professionalized
and dignified bankruptcy practice.
3 9 3
But Professor Brubaker's concerns about exceptionalism confuse
the normative and the descriptive. As noted in the Introduction, we
do not generally find bankruptcy in other nations' constitutions. 394 It
strains credulity to say that bankruptcy jurisdiction has been treated
like other matters of federal jurisdiction. It would, for example, be
exceedingly difficult to draw a straight line starting at Seminole Tribe,
through Alden, and ending at Katz. Even Brubaker grudgingly
acknowledges that Katz may be "an indication that bankruptcy is
somehow intrinsically different from Congress's other Article I pow-
ers."395 Nor is it possible to identify any other federal judicial officer
that manages the complex mix of state and federal, public and pri-
vate, administrative and judicial matters addressed by bankruptcy
judges. Nor can we say with great confidence that property, due pro-
cess, and religious liberty all get the same treatment in bankruptcy as
out. While we may want to cabin the bankruptcy power within
received constitutional doctrine, the facts would seem to point in a
different direction thus far.
The ultimate question about bankruptcy exceptionalism is, as
suggested by Professor Lessig, whether it is constitutionally "sense-
less."39 6 The answer, I think, is largely "no." Exceptionalism certainly
implies a potential to be senseless-what meta-rules determine the
exceptions? Nevertheless, the exigent nature of financial distress
makes sensible the expansive interpretations we have generally given
to the bankruptcy power. Because financial failure is the exception
rather than the norm, our approach to bankruptcy sensibly (if unwit-
tingly) tolerates (and perhaps seeks) exceptional treatment to the
constitutional ordering that underpins the state private law which gen-
erally governs in the absence of distress. Bankruptcy exceptionalism
makes sense because our system needs a larger way to manage failure
in the presence of competing constitutional rules, standards, norms,
and values.
Professor Brubaker is understandably concerned about the ad
hocery that could follow from bounding the bankruptcy power solely
with the word "bankruptcies."397 As we have seen, Chief Justice Mar-
shall in Sturges observed that Congress had broad discretion to define
393 See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
394 See supra note 8.
395 Brubaker, supra note 160, at 97.
396 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
397 Brubaker, supra note 160, at 131-34.
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the term. 398 Taking his lead, no one then or now seriously argues that
the term should today bear its (probable) original meaning. But just
because we have expanded our understanding of the meaning and
role of bankruptcy does not mean bankruptcy creates unlimited fed-
eral power. The bankruptcy power most assuredly has constitutional
content-and constitutional boundaries-which can, in turn, help to
limit the exceptionalism we have seen thus far. The important ques-
tion is how to define the boundaries, thus assuring that bankruptcy
remains constitutionally sensible.
B. The Public-Private Continuum
One way to understand the boundaries of bankruptcy is to recog-
nize its unusual-perhaps unique-point on the public-private con-
tinuum. The idea that there is a continuum-and thus a distinction-
between "public" and "private" rights is not new, but is also somewhat
contested. The distinction is most frequently associated with the
"state action" doctrine, which has not necessarily been well
received.3 99 The distinction appears across constitutional and regula-
tory categories. 400 We do not need to come to any conclusions about
the strength of the distinction to recognize that bankruptcy presents a
highly complex mix of public and private rights. As discussed in Part
III.B above, many features of bankruptcy clearly involve "private"
rights, many do not. Although Northern Pipeline did not purport to
resolve the question for all time, the plurality opinion certainly
398 See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195 (1819) (noting that
the bankruptcy power "is, like every other part of the subject, one on which the legis-
lature may exercise an extensive discretion").
399 Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HAv. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (calling the state action case law "a
conceptual disaster area," which "has the flavor of a torchless search for a way out of a
damp echoing cave").
400 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480-90 (2005) (deciding
whether a particular use of a city's eminent domain power was for a permissible "pub-
lic" purpose under the Takings Clause); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 115 (2001) (asking whether on-campus religious conduct violates the First
Amendment by inquiring whether the conduct was genuinely that of the school or
merely of the private group, and whether the community would be "confused" as to
whether the school endorsed the Christian religion); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (noting in dicta that tolerance of private speech
endorsing religion is to be distinguished from government speech endorsing it); Rob-
erts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-21 (1984) (setting out a continuum of degrees
of "privacy" within "private" associations, ranging from the family (most private) to
for-profit entities (least private), to be used as a test for measuring the degree of a
plaintiff's First Amendment "right of association" in a given context).
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seemed to recognize the hybrid nature of bankruptcy in this
regard.
401
The complex relationship between public and private is central
not only to jurisdictional questions, but is also in the background of
the bankruptcy theory continuum discussed in Part I. Recall that the
proceduralist position would treat bankruptcy law as largely a proce-
dural mechanism for managing substantive rights determined by state
private law. Statists, by contrast, would tolerate a far greater degree of
public intrusion into the bankruptcy process. Recall also that neither
side can tell us much about what a constitutional theory of bankruptcy
should look like. Proceduralists will tend to assume that state private
law rules solve most problems, but cannot tell us what to do if the
Constitution creates, protects or alters those entitlements. Statists, by
contrast, would tell us that bankruptcy policy can adjust preban-
kruptcy entitlements, but cannot tell us where the stopping point is,
or what larger set of values should guide conflicts between the bank-
ruptcy power and other constitutional rules, standards, norms, and
values.
The irony here is that the public-private features of the bank-
ruptcy theory continuum share certain features with one of our most
important constitutional cases on the public-private distinction, Loch-
ner v. New York. 402 As is familiar, the Lochner Court struck New York's
maximum hour law, reasoning that the right to contract was a "lib-
erty" interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, with which
the state could not interfere. 40 3 The majority observed that "the limit
of the police power has been reached and passed in this case" because
the law was not supported by a sufficiently compelling state interest:
the health of bakers was not sufficiently important and/or threatened
by unregulated hours as to require state interference with the
employer-employee contract. 40 4 Lochner, therefore, viewed the status
quo-the private right to enter into contracts-as a "neutral" condi-
tion with which the state could not interfere absent a compelling
reason.
401 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982)
(plurality opinion) ("[T]he restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the
core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of
state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract damages that is at
issue in this case. The former may well be a 'public right,' but the latter obviously is
not.").
402 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
403 See id. at 57-58.
404 Id. at 58.
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Cass Sunstein has argued that Lochner stands for, among other
things, a certain view of "neutrality" and "baselines" in law.40 5 "For the
Lochner Court, neutrality, understood in a particular way, was a consti-
tutional requirement."40 6 Chief among the requirements of neutrality
was legislative deference to the common law, the "natural" source of
legal and economic order.40 7 Under Lochner "the existing distribution
of wealth is seen as natural, and [legislative] failure to act is seen as no
decision at all.... [F] or constitutional purposes, the existing distribu-
tion of wealth must be taken as simply 'there,' and . . . efforts to
change that distribution are impermissible."
40 8
The bankruptcy theory continuum maps onto discussions about
the public-private continuum as articulated by Lochner. The neutrality
of contract identified by Sunstein is similar (although hardly identi-
cal) to the "prebankruptcy entitlement" of the proceduralist creditors'
bargain. In both cases, we are told that the operative law simply exists,
devoid of political context, and-more importantly-resistant to polit-
ical (majority) will as expressed through legislation (New York's wage
and hour laws or Congress' Bankruptcy Code). Proceduralists have
not, of course, argued that Lochner, or, for that matter, the Bank-
ruptcy Clause, compels the creditors' bargain. Nor, for the most part,
do they argue that the Constitution prevents Congress from altering
these entitlements. Rather, they make their appeal based on norma-
tive assertions about what a better system might look like. But the end
result would be the same: loss allocations that would be determined by
a baseline set of private ordering rules that bankruptcy legislation
should not alter.
For their part, statists would latch onto Holmes' positivist dissent.
Loss allocation rules are as much Congress' business as protecting
bakers was the business of the New York legislature. "I strongly
believe," Holmes wrote,
that my agreement or disagreement [with New York policy] has
nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions
in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state consti-
tutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as
legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as
this, and which equally with this interfere with the liberty to con-
tract. Sunday laws and usury laws are ancient examples. 4°9
405 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 873-74 (1987).
406 Id. at 874.
407 See id. at 879.
408 Id. at 884.
409 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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To statists, bankruptcy is an essentially political question which the
Bankruptcy Clause has given Congress the power to answer virtually
any way it chooses. The answers may be messy or ugly or contrary to
what sound judges-or law professors-may want (in short, what
many would say of BAPCPA). But the option is the ballot box, not the
bench.
The competing positions of proceduralists and statists, like the
competing positions in Lochner, are fights over where on the public-
private continuum a particular power (bankruptcy) should reside and
what Congress may do with that power. While there is good reason to
respect state private law in bankruptcy, it is important to remember
that, for at least four reasons, bankruptcy has an important public
dimension.
First, as explained in Part III, bankruptcy is-and, Northern Pipe-
line suggests, to some extent must be-conducted in courts, which are
public fora.410 Among the consequences of a court-based bankruptcy
system is the fact that disclosures by the parties are presumptively pub-
lic. One of the looming constitutional fights in BAPCPA will be over
debtors' obligations to produce income tax returns and other private
information. 411 In the business context, we see fights about the
media's access to sensitive information about corporate debtors. 412
An administrative bankruptcy model might do a better job of main-
taining privacy than one lodged in courts. But if Northern Pipeline
means that disputes involving state private law require resolution by
an Article III judge, and the work of those judges is presumptively
public, then to this extent bankruptcy will be a public proceeding.
Second, bankruptcy courts have in certain respects been proxies
for regulators of large segments of the economy. When Congress
began the process of deregulating the airline industry in 1978, for
example, we might have believed that government's role would dimin-
ish.413 It obviously did in some respects; but in many respects, deregu-
lation simply shifted oversight from one public forum, the Civil
410 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84-87 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (striking down the jurisdictional grant of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Act).
411 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(e) (2) (A) (West Supp. 2007).
412 See In re Alterra Healthcare Corp., 353 B.R. 66, 73-74 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)
(discussing a newspaper's First Amendment right to access sealed information about
debtor settlements).
413 Control of airline price structure and other matters was vested in the Civil Aer-
onautics Board until 1978, when these matters were deregulated in the Airline Der-
egulation Act. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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Aeronautics Board, to another-bankruptcy courts. Similar observa-
tions can be made about the railroads, most of which, when in private
hands, went through bankruptcy or its federal equity receivership
forerunner. 414 The 3R Act Cases, discussed in Part IV.A above, address
just one of scores, if not hundreds, of railroad reorganizations man-
aged by the judiciary.
415
Third, we know that many of our early debt crises involved not
private obligations, but public ones. "[A] t the adoption of the consti-
tution," Chief Justice Marshall explained in Cohens v. Virginia,
4 16 "all
the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these
debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a very seri-
ous objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted; and the Court
maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm was general .... ,,417 Indeed, as
discussed in Part III.A above, private suits to recover these public
debts led to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. While these
decisions and crises did not specifically involve the bankruptcy power,
they bespeak the public nature of financial distress. When the govern-
ment could not pay, private debt holders held worthless paper, cor-
roding the chain of financial and economic relations. Along that
chain would be debtors and creditors for whom Congress, using the
bankruptcy power, could alter private arrangements.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we can see that the ulti-
mate power in bankruptcy-the discharge of debt-is the conversion
of what is usually a "private" right (a debt claim) into a public one-a
permanent injunction against its enforcement. As part of the "core"
of the bankruptcy power, the Northern Pipeline Court appears to have
viewed the discharge as a "public" right:
Appellants argue that a discharge in bankruptcy is indeed a "public
right," similar to such congressionally created benefits as "radio sta-
tion licenses, pilot licenses, or certificates for common carriers"
granted by administrative agencies. But the restructuring of debtor-
creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy
power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-created
private rights, such as the right to recover contract damages that is
at issue in this case. The former may well be a "public right," but
the latter obviously is not.
4 18
414 Railroad receivership is discussed further infra Part V.C.
415 See SKEEL, supra note 266, at 48-70.
416 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
417 Id. at 406.
418 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
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Which takes us back to Lochner. Lochner does not just resemble
the existing bankruptcy debate. It also hints at a solution, at least if we
want to make progress in understanding the constitutional contours
of bankruptcy. Justice Peckham's majority opinion did not say that
contract was an absolute right with which a state could never interfere
under its police power. Rather, private rights would give way in cer-
tain special (what the Court called "border"41 9 ) cases, such as Holden
v. Hardy,4 20 where state action could interfere with labor contracts.
42'
The limitation in Holden was tolerable because of the unusual nature
of the contract and limitation in question: the workers were not bak-
ers, but miners and smelters, whose working conditions made them
more vulnerable to predation by their employers, and thus more
dependent upon the state for protection.
4 22
We can extrapolate from this a more general theory of exigency
which says that state action will be tolerable even to the most Lochner-
ian of courts if it addresses a sufficiently emergent problem. Some
market actors-miners-may be placed in positions of disadvantage
that warrant state protection. We will make exceptions for them from
whatever the prevailing constitutional wisdom might be because of
their vulnerability. Perhaps, like Holden, bankruptcy policy-and the
bankruptcy power-should reflect exceptions to constitutional rules,
standards, norms, and values when bankruptcy law more closely
resembles the protections for miners in Holden than for the bakers in
Lochner.
Lochner's limiting principle of public rights-credible vulnerabil-
ity-tracks our earliest views of the bankruptcy power. Recall that as
originally conceived, the discharge was to be available only to the
"honest but unfortunate" debtor.4 23 The bankruptcy discharge would
be appropriate, in Justice Story's words, "to relieve the unfortunate
and meritorious debtor from a slavery of mind and body, which cuts
him off from a fair enjoyment of the common benefits of society."
424
Although we have developed complex (and, some would say, ineffec-
tive) mechanisms for sorting the deserving from the undeserving
debtor, this idealized vision of the debtor who has incurred losses
419 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54 (1905).
420 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
421 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54 (citing Holden, 169 U.S. 366).
422 Id. ("It was held [in Holden] that the kind of employment, mining, smelting,
etc., and the character of the employfs in such kinds of labor, were such as to make it
reasonable and proper for the State to interfere to prevent the employfs from being
constrained by the rules laid down by the proprietors in regard to labor.").
423 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
424 3 STORY, supra note 92, § 1107, at 6.
2008]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
through no fault of her own has been at the core of the public pur-
pose of the Bankruptcy Clause since the Framing.
425
Thus, Congress cannot and should not do anything it wants
under the guise of the Bankruptcy Clause. The proper public pur-
pose of the bankruptcy power will be to provide this sort of relief to
this person with this problem. The benefits of this remedy should
thus not be available to dishonest or "fortunate" (wealthy) debtors
who have taken improper advantage of the remedy. But punishment
of that sort of misconduct likely involves many other powers. It is, for
example, a subject either of state criminal law or any number of other
regimes that exist to punish debtors who abuse their creditors or the
systems in which they find themselves.
426
A corollary would be that legislation enacted for essentially pri-
vate purposes might be ultra vires the Bankruptcy Clause. We can
find support for this in Gibbons, apparently the only Supreme Court
cases striking down legislation under the Bankruptcy Clause. Here,
the Court struck down last-minute congressional legislation intended
to save the bankrupt Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad Com-
pany from liquidation under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 on uniform-
ity grounds. 427 The Court held that the Rock Island Railroad
Transition and Employee Assistance Act (RITA) violated the uniform-
ity condition of the Bankruptcy Clause as a law benefiting only a single
debtor.428 In striking the law as analogous to a "private bankruptcy
bill, '429 Justice Rehnquist observed:
425 I put to one side the important question of how this analysis plays out when the
debtor is an entity, rather than an individual. The "honest-but-unfortunate" norma-
tive vision developed when debtors-merchants-were personally liable for obliga-
tions incurred in trade. Story himself apparently believed strongly that bankruptcy
relief should not be available to corporations. See Beaston v. Farmers' Bank of Del.,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 102, 137 (1838) (Story, J., dissenting) ("[Bankruptcy laws] apply
exclusively to private persons; and cannot, without violence to the words and the
objects of that act, be strained so as to reach corporations. I think that the persons
intended by the act, are such persons only as may be brought within each of the
predicaments stated in the act.").
426 See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 58, 58-59 (2006) (stat-
ing the elements of fraudulent transfer as to present and future creditors); id. § 5, 7A
U.L.A. 129 (stating the elements of fraudulent transfer as to present creditors).
427 Ry. Labor Executive Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982).
428 Id. at 470-71
429 Some view the uniformity language of the Bankruptcy Clause as intended to
forbid state legislation discharging individual debts (known as "private bankruptcy
bills"). See, e.g., Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 56-57 (1983)
(interpreting Gibbons to be a prohibition on private bankruptcy legislation); see also
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Only Rock Island's creditors are affected by RITA's employee pro-
tection provisions . . . . Unlike the situation in the 3R Act Cases,
there are other railroads that are currently in reorganization pro-
ceedings, but these railroads are not affected by the employee pro-
tection provisions of RITA.... The ... provisions of RITA cover
neither a defined class of debtors nor a particular type of problem,
but a particular problem of one bankrupt railroad. . . . RITA is
nothing more than a private bill such as those Congress frequently
enacts under its authority to spend money.
430
Gibbons is important because it helps to define the bankruptcy
power. It says not only that bankruptcy laws must be uniform, but that
they cannot be "private" legislation. Congress cannot use the bank-
ruptcy power to advance the largely private agenda of a group of
select individuals or interests. Bankruptcy relief-or at least the dis-
charge-must have some meaningfully public interest to come within
the bankruptcy power. Otherwise, it is ultra vires.
4 3 1
C. Debt and Democracy
The public purposes of the bankruptcy power are not without
limit. An important class of constraints should be reflected in the
democratic and countermajoritarian protections the bankruptcy sys-
tem uses, and how it uses them. As noted above, certain features of
bankruptcy depend explicitly on voting by creditors and shareholders.
In particular, creditors in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases elect the
debtor's trustee, 4 32 and creditors and other stakeholders vote on reor-
ganization plans under Chapter 11.4 33 But bankruptcy also incorpo-
rates countermajoritarian protections-perhaps the most important
being the construct of priority in right of payment.
Nadelmann, supra note 89, at 218-28 (discussing the full faith and credit problems
created by private state bankruptcy discharges).
430 Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 470-71 (footnote omitted).
431 The force of Gibbons may be questioned as it rather weakly distinguished the
3R Act Cases which, as discussed above, upheld reorganization legislation enacted for
the benefit of the Penn Central Railroad. See id. at 470 ("[A] quite different sort of
'uniformity' question is presented in these cases. By its terms, RITA applies to only
one regional bankrupt railroad. Only Rock Island's creditors are affected by RITA's
employee protection provisions and only employees of the Rock Island may take bene-
fit of the arrangement." (footnote omitted)); see also Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure, supra
note 6, at 36 (noting Gibbons' inconsistency with the 3RAct Cases). Gibbons' defects do
not, however, undermine my basic claim that the discharge should be understood as a
public right constrained by certain constitutional values, including that it have a pub-
lic purpose.
432 11 U.S.C. §§ 702, 1104(b)(1) (2000).
433 Id. § 1126.
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The notion that creditor democracy should determine the
debtor's fate is rooted in English law, which established the institution
before the Framing. 434 It is intuitively appealing to believe that we
tolerate some of the violence done by bankruptcy-the discharge in
particular-because it is, at least in reorganization, "what the creditors
wanted." But the tyranny of majority rule can present real problems
in bankruptcy, in at least two ways. First, and as noted in Part IV.B
above, a concern in mass tort cases will involve whether bankruptcy's
classification scheme assures tort creditors of adequate representation
and voice in the process of voting on the plan. Creditors with today's
medical bills are likely to have different preferences than creditors
whose claims have not yet been made manifest. The voting process
should assure that both sets of rightsholders have adequate voice.
Second, there are concerns about voting abuse. There is, as
David Skeel has observed, a long history of vote manipulation in the
context of railroad receiverships which, as discussed in Part III.B
above, were the forerunners of our modern reorganizations. 43 5 Here,
widely dispersed bondholders would be asked to "deposit" their bonds
with a "protective committee" formed and overseen usually by Wall
Street professionals (investment bankers and lawyers) .4 36 This com-
mittee would then have the capacity to "vote" the bonds for the pro-
posed reorganization by consenting to the contract ("plan") to
restructure the railroad.
43 7
Creditor franchise problems were perhaps most acute when
senior and junior parties-banks and shareholder/managers-would
"collude" in the formation of the plan. In many cases, the junior
shareholders were permitted to retain their interest in the railroad
even though the bondholders-who would have been senior to share-
holders under a rule of strict priority-would be paid little if anything
in the reorganization. 438 This defiance of priority norms led the
Supreme Court to develop a theory of "absolute priority," first articu-
lated in the 1899 Louisville Trust decision, 439 where the Supreme
434 See MANN, supra note 1, at 1-76. Probably the best discussion of creditor voting
in Chapter 11 cases appears in David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate
Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992).
435 See SKEEL, supra note 266, at 48-70.
436 See id. at 58.
437 See id. at 58-60.
438 Lubben, supra note 226, at 1445 ("One of the most controversial features of
receiverships was the frequency with which existing shareholders were able to main-
tain their position in the reorganized railroad, despite the failure to pay creditors in
full.").
439 Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry., 174 U.S. 674 (1899).
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Court struck a railroad reorganization for failing to make proper
accommodation for bondholders.440 The rule of Louisville Trust came
to be known as the "absolute priority rule," with its most famous
expression in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. 4 4 1 Case held that
reorganization plans had to be "fair, equitable and feasible," and that
these were "words of art"442 that reflected the "'familiar rule' that 'the
stockholder's interest in the property is subordinate to the rights of
creditors; first of secured and then of unsecured creditors.'- 443
A subtext in these railroad reorganizations is a concern about
creditor democracy. Priority would protect bondholders when the
vote would not because the bondholder interests were not adequately
represented. To be sure, the shareholder/creditor franchise is not
quite as ihaportant as the political franchise. Nor is it suggested that
the absolute priority rule is a constitutional requirement. But the
majoritarian features of both offer protections that any good constitu-
tional theory of bankruptcy should recognize.
Notice also that priority serves a dual role in bankruptcy: by creat-
ing class voting, it preserves the franchise, but in its stronger forms-
the secured claim-is effectively countermajoritarian. The secured
creditor's claim will be classified separately because it is not suffi-
ciently "like" any others (no other creditors having exactly the same
rights with respect to exactly the same thing). The secured creditor
will have a veto unless the plan provides the secured creditor "fair and
equitable treatment"-meaning, in effect, payments equal to the pre-
sent value of the collateral, or something similar.
The countermajoritarian nature of priority, like the majority-pro-
tecting rules of creditor democracy, are each attributes of bankruptcy
that mimic the larger constitutional system that gives rise to them.
Any good conception of the constitutional limits of the bankruptcy
power should reflect these values and develop their implications.
VI. WHAT'S AT STAKE
The preceding Part distinguished descriptive from prescriptive
exceptionalism, and suggested ways in which the exceptionalism of
440 Id. at 684.
441 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
442 Id. at 115.
443 Id. at 116 (quoting Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. at 684). Nor would side agree-
ments between seniors and juniors (shareholders) be tolerated: "'[A] ny arrangement
of the parties by which the subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are
attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of either class of creditors
comes within judicial denunciation."' Id. (quoting Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. at
684).
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bankruptcy may be channeled and contained. But if, as Professor Les-
sig argues, constitutional theory should be "low down" and "near the
data,"444 then the important question will be whether these insights
help answer hard and realistic questions. This Part addresses three:
(1) some that have already arisen under BAPCPA, (2) those that
might arise in response to the subprime mortgage crisis, and (3) those
that might arise in response to the continuing financial distress of
religious organizations, such as Catholic dioceses.
A. BAPCPA
As discussed above, the Katz decision's suggestive dilation of the
Bankruptcy Clause could not have come at a worse time for many
bankruptcy observers, given what Congress has actually done with that
power recently.445 On April 20, 2005, after many years of contentious
debate, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in order to "get
tough" on allegedly fraudulent consumer debtors.446 The stated pur-
pose of BAPCPA is to "improve bankruptcy law and practice by restor-
ing personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and
ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors. '44 7 Its
legislative history stretches over almost a decade, but its essential
goal-urged by the consumer credit industry-was a complex "means
test" intended to prevent debtors who "can pay" from obtaining a dis-
charge by requiring them to commence cases under Chapter 13 (gov-
erning "wage earner" plans) rather than Chapter 7 (straight
liquidations) 448
BAPCPA was about as controversial as bankruptcy legislation can
get-which is to say very. Part of the controversy had to do with the
way it came into being. The main lobbying forces for the bill were
some of the nation's leading consumer credit providers or their repre-
444 See Lessig, supra note 78, at 1838.
445 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373-79 (2006). For further
discussion of Katz, see supra Parts II.B.3, III.A.
446 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11, 12, 18, 28 U.S.C.). A discussion of the legislative history of BAPCPA is set forth
in Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 79 Am. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005).
447 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005).
448 BAPCPA § 102(a), 119 Stat. at 27-33 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West
Supp. 2007)). The test requires that a Chapter 7 petition be dismissed or converted
to Chapter 13 if it is determined that a debtor with primarily consumer debts will be
able to pay unsecured creditors a specified amount in a Chapter 13 plan. See Eugene
R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 Am. BANKR. L.J. 231, 231-42 (2005).
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sentatives, including Visa, MasterCard, Ford Motor Credit Corpora-
tion, and the General Motors Acceptance Corporation. 449 As of
March 2005, they had allegedly spent more than $40 million in politi-
cal fundraising and "millions more on lobbying efforts since 1989."
4
50
°
This was viewed as an extraordinary investment in legislation.
Princeton economist Howard Rosenthal noted that "'[i]t is rare to
find such clear evidence of the effects of money' in Washington
politics."
45 1
BAPCPA is widely viewed as the worst sort of private legislative
failure. 45 2 Its early incarnation was "brought forward at the eleventh
hour from a secret, closed-door conference [from] which the House
minority was virtually excluded," "written by and for the big banks, the
credit card industry, and other special interest groups." 453 David Gray
Carlson has observed that it is not only harsh, but also a technical
disaster, riddled with drafting errors. 454 According to Carlson, it actu-
ally encourages bankruptcy abuse by making it easier for wealthy debt-
ors to hide assets and discharge debt.
45 5
449 Stephen Labaton, Bankruptcy Bill Set for Passage; Victory for Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2005, at C5.
450 Id.
451 See Elizabeth Warren, Op-Ed., Show Me the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at
A21 (quoting Stephen Nunez & Howard Rosenthal, Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress:
Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Hoor Voting in the Legislative Process 32 (Russell Sage
Found., Working Paper No. 196, 2002), available at http://www.russellsage.org/publi-
cations/workingpapers/BankruptcyReformInCongress/document).
452 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding on
to Cars, Homes and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457,
457 n.3 (2005) (noting that some have taken to calling BAPCPA "by the fanciful acro-
nym BARF (BAnkrutcy ReForm Act)"); Catherine E. Vance & Corinne Cooper, Nine
Traps and One Slap: Attorney Liability Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 79 Am. BANKR. L.J.
283, 284 (2005) ("It's a behemoth of bad policy, an illiteracy of ill-conceived provi-
sions, an underbelly of unintended consequences."). It is not universally viewed this
way. Professor Todd Zywicki is rare, if not alone, among legal academics in defending
the technical and normative merits of BAPCPA. In testimony before the Judiciary
Committee, Zywicki stated that BAPCPA was "fine as it is" and that "[t
] here is no word
that I would change in this particular piece of legislation." See In re Kane, 336 B.R.
477, 481 n.7 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (quoting Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005: Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm. on S. 256, 109th Cong.
unofficial transcript (2005) (statement of Todd Zywicki)).
453 144 CONG. REC. 24928 (1998) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
454 See David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Revolution of 2005, 15 Am.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 227 (2007) ("BAPCPA adds a great amount of detail and is
rife with bad draftsmanship, dumbfounding contradictions, and curious, even comi-
cal, special interest exceptions.").
455 Id. ("The conclusion of my study is that the means test either encourages bank-
ruptcy abuse or has no effect.").
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the first to mount major challenges to
BAPCPA were lawyers. In a series of recent cases, lawyers have
invoked First Amendment speech protections to challenge BAPCPA
provisions requiring attorneys to advertise themselves as "debt relief
agencies" and/or limiting their ability to counsel their clients on cer-
tain matters. In Hersh v. United States,456 for example, a Texas bank-
ruptcy attorney sued the Attorney General of the United States and
the Attorney General of Texas seeking a declaration that § 527(b) was
unconstitutional. 457  This section requires attorneys to provide
"assisted persons" with written notice of specified information regard-
ing bankruptcy. 458 The court held that BAPCPA's advertising provi-
sions did not violate a lawyer's speech rights under the First
Amendment. 459 The court reasoned that the advertising provision
advances a sufficiently compelling government interest and does
not unduly burden either the attorney-client relationship or the
ability of a client to seek bankruptcy. The government clearly has a
legitimate interest in attempting to ensure that a client is informed
of certain basic information before he or she commences a case in
bankruptcy. The amount of debt discharged by bankruptcy in a
given year can be tens of billions of dollars .... Thus, the govern-
ment interest is significant.
Given that significant interest, the compelled speech of section
527 is a reasonable burden.
460
In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States,461 by contrast,
the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota struck
down both the advertising provisions and restrictions on advising a
client about incurring additional debt in contemplation of bankruptcy
as overly broad, and thus violating the First Amendment. 462 In deny-
ing the United States' motion to dismiss, the court first considered
whether the advice restrictions of § 526(a) (4) were unconstitu-
tional. 463 The court reasoned that the advisory restrictions were "a
456 347 B.R. 19 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
457 Id. at 21-22.
458 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 527(b) (2007).
459 Hersh, 347 B.R. at 27.
460 Id. (citation omitted). While Hersh upheld the advertising rules, it held that
restrictions contained in § 526 on advice attorneys can give to potential debtor clients
were unconstitutional. See id. at 24-25 (holding that the provision restricting advice
was "overinclusive in at least two respects: (1) it prevents lawyers from advising clients
to take lawful actions; and (2) it extends beyond abuse to prevent advice to take pru-
dent actions").
461 355 B.R. 758 (D. Minn. 2006).
462 Id. at 763-67.
463 Section 526(a) (4) states:
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content-based regulation of attorney speech" because they "restrict[ ]
attorneys from giving particular information and advice to their cli-
ents. '4 64 The court rejected the government's argument that the
restrictions were supported by compelling interests in discouraging
debtors from "'gaming' the means test by improperly enlarging pre-
existing debt, thereby diluting the assets of the bankruptcy estate avail-
able to creditors."465 The court concluded that the government's
interest not only failed a compelling interest test-it did not even
make sense. "Incurring debt on the eve of bankruptcy can scarcely be
considered malum in se. To the contrary, for some individuals[,]
incurring further obligations, even those which must be adjusted or
set aside in the bankruptcy, may be financially prudent."
466
The Milavetz court also rejected the government's claim (and the
reasoning of Hersh) that there was a compelling interest in regulating
bankruptcy-related advertising as contemplated under Bankruptcy
Code § 528. Here, too, the court found that the statute failed to
accomplish its purported purpose, in this case protecting the public
from misleading claims about debt relief. BAPCPA's definition of a
"debt relief agency," the court observed, was so broad as to sweep
together both lawyers and nonlawyers providing bankruptcy and simi-
lar services: "The requirement that parties so dissimilarly-placed must
use the same mandated disclosure statement is likely to cause con-
sumer confusion. In this respect, § 528 fails to directly advance the
government's stated interest in clarifying bankruptcy service advertise-
ments. ' 467 Nor was it sufficiently narrow: "This sweeping regulation
goes beyond whatever problem it was designed to address. It broadly
regulates absolutely truthful advertisements throughout an entire
field of legal practice.
'4 68
The maneuvering over the attorney rules in BAPCPA is impor-
tant, but may distract us from what are arguably more fundamental
problems with the legislation. These provisions may flunk First
A debt relief agency shall not ... advise an assisted person or prospective
assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of such person filing a
case under this title or to pay an attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer
fee or charge for services performed as part of preparing for or representing
a debtor in a case under this title.
11 U.S.C.A. § 526(a) (4) (West Supp. 2007), invalidated by Hersh, 347 B.R. 19.
464 Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 764 ("Attorneys are forbidden to advise their clients con-
cerning an entire subject-incurring more debt in contemplation of filing for bank-
ruptcy. This is a plain regulation of speech.").
465 Id. at 765,
466 Id.
467 Id. at 767,
468 Id.
2008]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Amendment scrutiny. But they may also simply be outside the scope
of Congress' bankruptcy power. If, as discussed in the Introduction,
we view the Bankruptcy Clause as creating, among others, the powers
to manage intercreditor disputes, distribute a debtor's assets, remedy
fraud, and discharge the debts of the "honest but unfortunate"
debtor, then provisions regulating attorney advertising or the attor-
ney-client relationship seem suspect.469 Preventing a debtor from
receiving legal advice about debt would seem not to have much to do
with adjusting the existing relations between debtors and creditors.
This would be public interference with private arrangements-the
attorney-client relationship-that could not credibly come within the
bankruptcy power. Of course, if the advice was to incur indebtedness
with the intention of harming other creditors, we no longer have an
honest but unfortunate debtor. But that raises a host of other
problems, which would likely be addressed by other (state) laws.
B. Subprime Mortgage Crisis
BAPCPA is already on the books, and is already being challenged
on certain constitutional grounds: some of those challenges might
succeed. But it is hardly the only possible source of constitutional
conflict involving bankruptcy on the horizon. Consider next some
possible congressional responses to the subprime mortgage crisis.
It is already well known that the explosive growth in residential
real estate values of recent years was fueled in part by subprime
financing, lending to those whose credit may not in fact have war-
ranted a mortgage under traditional lending standards. Home mort-
gage lenders have reported significant spikes in defaults. 470 With
more than two million hybrid adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs)
scheduled to "reset" in fall 2007-peaking in October with more than
$50 billion due-it would be easy to imagine that Congress might be
tempted to amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide relief.471 Con-
sider the following hypothetical:
Congress enacts the "Helping Families Avoid Foreclosure Act" of 2008
("the Act"). The Act amends, among other things, Chapters 7, 11, and 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code to recognize a new type of debtor, the "subprime debtor."
469 See Plank, Limits, supra note 6, at 491-92 (arguing that the bankruptcy power
should be limited to legislation governing relations between an insolvent debtor and
his creditors).
470 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, More Home Foreclosures Loom as Owners Face Mort-
gage Maze, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al.
471 See Les Christie, Mortgage Reset: Record Bill Coming Due, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug.
13, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/07/09/realestate/resets are coming/
index.htm.
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Subprime debtors are those whose primary residence is subject to a subprime
mortgage (as defined), and who did not engage in any fraud or deception in
procuring the loan. The Act would empower the subprime debtor, with or with-
out consent of the lender, to adjust the subprime mortgage in bankruptcy by (1)
reducing the outstanding amount to the present judicially appraised value of
the property; (2) preventing the upward adjustment of any adjustable mortgage
above the initial "teaser" rate; (3) preventing the mortgagee from foreclosing for
a period of three years from the commencement of the case, provided that the
debtor makes "reasonable" monthly payments (e.g., those at the "teaser" rate);
and (4) providing that the debtor may prepay the loan at the reduced rate
without regard to any prepayment prohibition or penalty. Can Congress do
this ?
This hypothetical472 would go to the heart of the retroactivity
problem discussed in Part IV.A above. It would pit Congress' acknowl-
edged power to enact bankruptcy legislation against the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Mortgagees affected by this legisla-
tion would have credible arguments that the Act would substantially
impair vested interests in their debtors' property, interests which can-
not be "taken" without compensation.
Under the analysis proposed in this Article, since the lien is a
property interest, the first question is whether the Act would provide a
bankruptcy remedy for an "honest but unfortunate debtor." Assum-
ing the debtors in question did not collude with their lenders, or oth-
erwise engage in misconduct in order to obtain the loan (and this may
be a hard determination in many cases), the legislation would satisfy
this criteria.
The next question is whether the Act contains sufficient demo-
cratic or countermajoritarian protections to pass constitutional scru-
tiny. Here, the Act would provide the lender no meaningful franchise
if the subprime debtor can force the lender to accept inferior terms.
The important question then becomes whether the Act contains suffi-
cient countermajoritarian protections for the lender's priority interest
in the subprime debtor's property. The resolution of this question
should turn, at least in part, on the legitimacy of the appraisals. If the
mortgagees can show that the appraisals unfairly or arbitrarily reduce
the value of the subject properties, then cases like Radford, Security
Industrial Bank, and the 3R Act Cases, discussed in Part IV.A above,
472 This might not be so hypothetical. See supra note 32; see also Les Christie, Sub-
prime Solution: Swap ARMs for Fixed-Rates, CNNMoNEY.coM, Apr. 18, 2007, http://
money.cnn.com/2007/04/18/real_estate/foreclosurebailouts_/index.htm ("Panel
members at a Congressional hearing on the subprime crisis recommend changing the
terms of ARM loans to forestall foreclosures.").
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suggest that they should have a remedy. Of course, as the 3R Act Cases
suggest, that remedy may be recovering from the government itself.
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If a court concluded that the Act provided inadequate demo-
cratic or countermajoritarian protections for mortgagees, and offered
no Tucker Act compensation, the Court may then engage in the sort
of balancing suggested in Part IV.A above: was the financial crisis Con-
gress addressed in the Act so dire as to warrant this sort of invasion
into vested property rights? This question cannot be answered today.
The answer would depend in part on the depth of the subprime mort-
gage crisis and the reasonableness of Congress' view of it. It would,
however, be consistent with a view that the Bankruptcy Clause creates
the exceptional power to address serious existing financial crises.
C. Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas
A third set of problems that may credibly arise in the near future
would involve the bankruptcy reorganizations of the various Catholic
dioceses. The diocesan bankruptcy cases to date have been resolved
in more or less consensual ways. But it is not difficult to imagine a
bankruptcy judge losing patience with a recalcitrant bishop, who ref-
uses to carry out the duties imposed upon him as management of the
diocesan debtor in possession. Consider the following hypothetical:
Facing millions of dollars in liability from priests'sexual misconduct, Dio-
cese X ("the Debtor") commenced a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. While the
Debtor has assets sufficient to make meaningful partial payments to its tort
creditors, it would have to sell valuable church properties in order to do so. The
Debtor's tort creditors demand that the Debtor sell these properties to fund its
plan of reorganization. The Debtor's management, Bishop Y, refuses, arguing
that these properties are held in trust for the benefit of parishioners recognized in
canon law, but not state private law. Bishop Y has also refused to negotiate or
share confidential books and records with the creditors' committee. Without
information about the Debtor, the creditors' committee is unable to propose a
meaningful reorganization plan, even though the Debtor's exclusive right to file
such a plan has expired.
Faced with these problems, the Bankruptcy Court, on motion of the credi-
tors' committee, appoints a Chapter 11 trustee ("the Trustee") who takes over
management of the Debtor's affairs and properties. The order of appointment
assures Bishop Y and the Debtor's parishioners that Bishop Y and his clerics
may continue to peform religious duties during the case. The Trustee proposes
the following plan ("the Plan "), which enjoys the overwhelming support of cred-
itors: (1) all of the Debtor's property except the main church facility will be sold,
473 See supra notes 347-51 and accompanying text.
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with the proceeds to be distributed to creditors; (2) these properties include
smaller parish churches, parochial schools, and a hospital; (3) all of the clerical
staff except Bishop Y and an assistant will be laid off; (4) although the main
church facility will continue to be used for worship (in services to be led by
Bishop Y or a bishop designated by the church), it will also be used to hold
nightly bingo games, the proceeds of which will also be used to pay creditors.
Can the Bankruptcy Court constitutionally approve this plan?
This hypothetical squarely presents the competition between the
bankruptcy power and the First Amendment discussed in Part IV.C
above. As with the preceding hypothetical, the scope of the bank-
ruptcy judge's power should be determined in light of the nature of
the bankruptcy power. The first question is, on the analysis set forth
in this Article, whether the Debtor is of the "honest but unfortunate"
variety. Here, as with any entity, it will be important to distinguish the
various stakeholders. Certainly, priests who have committed sexual
abuse-and bishops who have concealed this-would not qualify. But
the entity also reflects the interests of others, including creditors and
parishioners. As to these individuals, it is proper to conceive of the
entity as "honest but unfortunate" since these stakeholders should,
under conventional notions of priority, succeed to control and/or
"ownership" of the debtor.
474
Assuming the Debtor qualifies in this normative respect, the next
question is whether the bankruptcy process embodies adequate demo-
cratic and countermajoritarian protections. Creditor support for the
Plan suggests that the franchise has been satisfied. But what about the
rights of parishioners? If they are not creditors-and probably they
are not-they will lack standing to vote on the Plan. It will not likely
be possible to give parishioners a vote either. Not being creditors,
there is no "amount" that would be used to calculate their vote under
Bankruptcy Code § 1126.
Are there nevertheless countermajoritarian protections for the
parishioners? The Latter-Day Saints cases, discussed in Part IV.C
above, suggest the Court has historically had little interest in protect-
ing the property interests of religious debtors. There is no obvious
reason why the Court would view the parishioners-who likely have
no interest in church property cognizable at state law-more sympa-
thetically. The important question would then become whether the
474 Of course, on this view, many entities will be "honest but unfortunate," even if
used by the dishonest to perpetrate a fraud. See supra note 425. I also put to one side
the somewhat artificial dictates of the "in pari delicto" doctrine, which holds that a
corporation used to perpetrate a fraud may be at equal fault with the perpetrators.
See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340,
358 (3d Cir. 2001).
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continued, if diminished, role of Bishop Y sufficiently protects the
religious liberty interests of the parishioners and the bishop himself.
This would be a difficult determination for a court to make. It should
be a question the court tries to avoid. If it cannot, however, the better
answer would be to confirm the Plan. The minimal protections for
the parishioners appear greater than those accorded in the Latter-Day
Saints cases. This countermajoritarian protection would help guide
and justify what is admittedly a difficult decision.
CONCLUSION
The preceding Part considered three sets of constitutional ques-
tions that bankruptcy has presented or may present in the foreseeable
future. While reasonable minds can differ on their resolution, the
purpose here has been to identify the deeper puzzles and themes in
bankruptcy's constitutional role, and to begin to develop a framework
for addressing those puzzles and themes.
That framework should recognize that bankruptcy has long been
about the scope of the polity. The first English bankruptcy statute was
enacted to deal with the growing number of debtors who, after "craft-
ily obtaining into their hands great Substance of other men ['] s goods,
do Suddenly flee to parts unknown." 475 The practice of "keeping
house" or seeking sanctuary in the church were equally forms of evad-
ing debt by escaping the reach of the state.476 To this extent, if no
other, bankruptcy is intimately bound up with the nature and power
of government.
But the polity's great aspirations, as expressed in the Constitu-
tion, have often fit awkwardly with those of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
has thus involved a series of exceptions-to the types of rules the Con-
stitution permits Congress to create, and to the rules, standards,
norms, and values that animate the Constitution's organic, structural,
and substantive elements. There is an important relationship between
debt and democracy-a relationship that warrants further
exploration.
475 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4, § 1 (1542-1543) (Eng.).
476 See MANN supra note 1, at 26 ("Some debtors kept to their houses-sometimes
for years-where they were safe from service of process.").
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